

W  
1658

F.O.

484

9

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

*Printed for the use of the Foreign Office*

(20143)

Copy No.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

# THE LEBANON

PART 9

January to December 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
<b>General Correspondence</b>			
1 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 10	1955 Jan. 7	Annual review for 1954 ... ..	1
2 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 41 E.	Mar. 31	The Lebanese budget for 1955 ... ..	5
3 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 1042/1/55 G	June 6	Review of Anglo-Lebanese relations ... ..	7
4 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 92	July 8	Review of the political situation in the Lebanon ... ..	8
5 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 93	July 11	Sami Solh's new Government ... .. Constituted on the 9th July, 1955.	11
6 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 100	July 18	Debate in the Lebanese Chamber preceding the vote of confidence for Sami Solh's new Government ... ..	13
7 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 116	Aug. 11	Report on a speech by President Camille Chamoun at the village of Deir el Kamar ... ..	15
8 Mr. Scott ... .. No. 135	Sept. 15	The resignation of Sami Solh's Government ... ..	18
9 Mr. Scott ... .. No. 142	Sept. 14	Formation of a new Government by Rachid Karame ... ..	20
10 Mr. Scott ... .. No. 148	Oct. 5	Debate in the Chamber of the new Lebanese Government's statement of policy ... ..	22
<b>Appendix—Biographical Notes</b>			
11 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 49	1955 Apr. 25	Annual report on the heads of foreign missions ... ..	(1)
12 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 63	May 26	Annual report on the leading personalities ... ..	[ 1

## SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

## ANGLO-LEBANESE RELATIONS—

Review of—3.

## ANNUAL REPORT ON THE HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS—

—11.

## ANNUAL REPORT ON LEADING PERSONALITIES—12.

## ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1954—1.

## BUDGET FOR 1955—2.

## CAMILLE CHAMOUN, PRESIDENT—

Report on a speech at village of Deir el Kamar—7.

## POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE LEBANON—

Review of the—4.

## RACHID KARAME'S GOVERNMENT—9 and 10.

## SAMI SOLH'S GOVERNMENT—5, 6 and 8.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
THE LEBANON—PART 9

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

VL 1011/1

No. 1

LEBANON: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1954

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 15)*

(No. 10. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
Sir, *January 7, 1955.*

I have the honour to submit my annual political review of the Lebanon for 1954.

**Introduction**

2. The three most important features of the Lebanese scene are the fixed mosaic pattern of the religious communities (especially the balance between Moslems and Christians); the convention that the President must be a Maronite; and the almost absolute powers of the President: everything turns on what sort of a man he is.

**President Chamoun**

3. A year ago we saw the President rather in the rôle of a Prince Charming who had lost his way. This year the audience have begun to boo and some of the cast have resigned, yet the person most concerned seems to be quite unaware of the changing atmosphere and thoroughly pleased with himself and his performance. He has completely failed to impose himself. Not that he is a bad influence—on the contrary, his path is paved with good intentions, but he is vain and ineffectual. He was brought to power with popular acclaim only two years ago to effect reforms which are now a dead letter. All his interventions are half-hearted; none are pressed home. He has failed to complete his scheme of electoral reform; his laudable schemes for industrial and agricultural development are progressing all too slowly; during the year he has antagonised every member of the small parliamentary Opposition group that organised his predecessor's downfall. At the same time he has left his old enemies unscathed and unconciliated and they are now beginning to reorganise and even combine with his old friends. If he lasts out his term of office (and he is not yet half-way round the course) it will be

for lack of general agreement upon a successor. This is characteristic, for everything that surrounds him is indeterminate, negative. The year closes with general acceptance that the revolution has failed. Camille Chamoun was not *à la hauteur*.

**The Presidential Powers**

4. Under the Mandate, the French High Commissioner could veto new legislation and there was some political advantage to the French in allowing seemingly wide powers in the hands of the President. The Constitution remains unchanged, with the result that the President may, if he chooses, dismiss and appoint Ministers without advice, choose Ministers from outside Parliament and, within wide limits, govern autocratically. One of the aims of the movement against the former presidential régime was to amend the Constitution so as to establish a parliamentary democracy; and at the beginning of the year President Chamoun was still careful not to offend against the reformist spirit—all his Ministers were Deputies. But as resignations and reshuffles revealed the paucity of "ministrables" in the reformed and shrunken elected Chamber the President was compelled to resort to the practice he himself had so criticised in the past and bring people into the Government from outside Parliament.

**The Mosaic Pattern**

5. Every Lebanese is sharply conscious of the balance held, under the convention called the "Pacte National," between the various religious communities, and is quick to detect any movement tending to upset it or prejudice his own community's position and interests. During the past year the Moslem population has continued to increase and the demand has been raised, albeit not yet insistently, for a revision of the "pacte" in their favour.

This has provoked a strong Christian reaction. Since most of the million and a half overseas Lebanese are Christians there has been talk of legislation to inscribe these on the parliamentary electoral rolls as absent voters; but in the face of Moslem opposition this proposal is not likely to reach the Statute Book. Tension and rivalry, however, are always latent: a Christian pamphlet offensive to Islam nearly caused a riot during the summer. A month or two later, the nation-wide processions and outdoor masses organised by the Maronites and Catholics for the Marian Year incited the Moslems to celebrate the Birth of the Prophet with torchlights and fireworks. The Orthodox, who, through the centuries, have learnt the secret of how to survive as a religious minority, seized the opportunity to urge the banning of all outdoor religious gatherings and at the same time called public attention to the fact that the Orthodox community was entitled, on its numerical strength, to a larger share of the public offices.

6. Every religious community here is divided against itself, which seems paradoxical when one reflects that the sole reason for their existence is to demonstrate that unity among co-religionists is strength; but is understandable when one realises that the "pacte national," which reserves certain high offices of State for certain communities, thereby obliges the leaders of those communities to compete with one another. This, in a country where personalities and not policies count and where people are quick to take offence, soon leads to bitter strife. When there is no outstanding strong personality in office as President or Prime Minister, the tendency towards fragmentation rather than unity is intensified. This in turn increases fears that the general balance may be upset and the present year closes with many Christians, particularly Maronites, wondering whether they will for long be able to hold the position unaided. If, as in the past, they are to look to Western Europe for aid, how can they continue to secure it without laying themselves open to charges of treason to the Arab world, thereby increasing the danger they seek most to avoid, namely concerted Moslem Arab action that might lead eventually to the suppression of Lebanon as an independent State?

#### Government

7. The year started with Abdulla Yafi as Prime Minister losing ground fast but

clinging on, supported by the President. In February, when Yafi resigned, the President took the easy and misguided course of asking him to try again. After ten days of consultation Yafi was able to form a Government that in fact lasted for six months. Then, however, Yafi could no longer be shored up, even by the President, and Sami Solh had to be sent for. Having delayed too long, the President now kept back too much, seeming to withhold complete confidence from his new Prime Minister; and the year ends with growing distrust between them.

#### External Relations, Political and Economic

8. Despite an occasional encouraging sign, for example, a parliamentary vote in favour of "co-operation with the West" in April, the Lebanon has stuck closely to the Arab League line on all major political questions. Yet it cannot be said that the Lebanon has no foreign policy apart from the League. Over the Israel Boycott Committee's decisions, especially those affecting Imperial Chemical Industries, the Lebanese Government were helpful; and towards Israel generally the Lebanese have again shown themselves less rabid than their fellow Arab Leaguers. Conditions on the Israel-Lebanese border have been satisfactory. Nevertheless, there has been no advance towards public acceptance of peace talks with Israel. Within the League, and even beyond, the Lebanon has lost no opportunity to proffer her services as a mediator, a political broker, a rôle in which she fancies herself but which parties in dispute seem reluctant to have her play. In particular, towards the end of the year the Lebanese have tried to bring both Egypt and Syria and Egypt and Iraq closer together. At Lake Success the Lebanon has voted consistently with the other Arab States, and despite private protestations of understanding and sympathy has proved adamant in her refusal to be persuaded to take any other course.

9. Apart from the foregoing, Lebanese endeavours abroad have been largely directed towards rectifying the heavy adverse balance of trade. Even within the Arab League the Lebanon has persistently advocated a customs union, with the object of improving Beirut's commercial position. Beirut has a free money market and a port with a free zone and trade and commerce generally have improved throughout the year. Receipts at the port and income from the airport have risen substantially

and are still rising while successful efforts have been made to increase home production, both industrial and agricultural. There has again been a budgetary surplus and there is no external public debt. There is ample cover in gold and United States dollars and other foreign exchange for the note issue. But the fact remains that the value of the country's visible imports is five times that of her exports and strenuous efforts have been made and, we are assured, will continue to be made, to buy primarily from those countries that buy here. Although this policy has many critics, at the end of the year the Council of Ministers recommended that double duty should be imposed on goods from countries with which Lebanon had no bilateral trade agreement. During the year such agreements were signed or ratified with Eastern Germany, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the German Federal Republic.

10. Lebanese policy is to liquidate, on reasonable terms, foreign concessionary concerns and during the year the Beirut Electricity Company dispute was finally settled on terms that satisfied even the French shareholders. Foreign investors have continued to show interest and Lebanese policy is to attract them. One of the means adopted to achieve this was legislation to exempt from income tax for six years profits on new industries.

11. We have had some trouble over the use, quite legitimate from the Lebanese point of view, of the Free Zone and the free money market for transfers of strategic raw materials to satellite countries. In the most important case, the transfer of two tankers from Sweden to Poland, United States diplomatic protests, supported by our own, won the day. That case clarified issues and it is now understood here that acceptance of American technical and economic aid carries the specific obligation to ban this sort of trade. But Beirut remains a trapdoor through which limited quantities of strategic raw materials and non-transferable sterling disappear.

12. The Lebanon's main concern is, as ever, Syria, upon whom she relies literally for her daily bread. Syria easily tops the list of suppliers and the balance of trade is heavily adverse to the Lebanon, which accordingly seeks to compensate by "services" and by acting as Syria's sea port and entrepôt. Repeated attempts throughout the year to reach such an economic agreement have foundered on the different

interpretations placed by the two countries on the term "economic union." The Lebanese want Syrian trade, not union. Meanwhile a temporary arrangement is in force and was renewed for three months during the last days of the year. The economies of the two countries which have in the past been, and could still be, complementary, are now apparently irreconcilable because the one is free and international and the other controlled and nationalistic. Despite this, relations between Syrians and Lebanese have throughout the greater part of the year been close and even cordial. The Shishakly régime was unpopular here and the Lebanese Government felt obliged to refuse Shishakly's request for permission to return to Damascus on February 27 after he had entered the Lebanon as a political refugee thirty-six hours earlier. When that crisis had passed there was for a few weeks something of a holiday atmosphere and frontier controls between the two countries, which had become very strict on the Syrian side during recent years, were spontaneously, if unofficially, abolished. These were soon restored but there has been a net gain and relations with Syria are much easier now than they were a year ago.

13. The agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had been reached in 1952, remained unratified by the Chamber throughout the year and unavailing efforts were made in the spring to reach the same terms of agreement by an exchange of letters. At the end of the year a similar attempt was again being made.

14. To keep the oil moving through Tripoli has always been regarded as one of our main interests here. Others to-day are our general trade position, air communications and defence. Despite the general upward trend of Lebanese trade, we have not had a very good year partly because of the effect of the various bilateral agreements. If, in addition, discriminatory import duties are levied on our goods we shall be in a still worse position. Although we are third on the list of the Lebanon's suppliers, we are tenth on that of her customers and the visible balance of trade between us is very heavily adverse to Lebanon.

15. We are, however, helping the Lebanese economy with oil dues and now, following an arrangement reached at the end of the year, we hope to invest substantially in Lebanese civil aviation.

B.O.A.C. in December agreed to purchase all the Pan-American shares in Middle East Air Lines plus a substantial proportion of the remaining shares. The total investment will be in the region of 1½ million sterling and we can, with reasonable luck, look forward to great things in the air here during 1955. Meanwhile, during 1954, Beirut airport traffic has increased by nearly 50 per cent. over the previous year and is still rising.

#### Defence

16. In the realm of defence also we have continued to help the Lebanese. The small Royal Air Force Training Mission has been maintained and enjoys a superlative reputation and a new British Civil Defence Adviser has been appointed. We have also supplied certain arms and military equipment to the Lebanese, who have shown themselves capable of grasping the main problems of regional defence.

#### Communism

17. Communism has remained a comparatively unimportant feature of the country's political life. It has made some little headway in the Orthodox Church and in the trade unions; but increasing Lebanese commercial prosperity has done something to remove popular discontent. The Lebanon continues to suffer from over-population and under-employment and is

thus an obvious target for communism. Both the President and the Prime Minister see this danger and are doing what they can, without so far achieving much, to create employment and raise the standard of living by development projects. For example, Lebanon signed in June an Economic Aid Agreement with the United States involving U.S. \$6 million; and has applied to the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development for a loan of U.S. \$35 million for the Litani project. A special mission from the bank carried out a survey during December, but its conclusions are not yet known.

18. To sum up, what little change there has been during the past year in the internal situation has been for the worse, the President having lost most of his popularity. In foreign affairs there is also little change, the country still being aligned with the Arab League though anxious to reinsure with the West. There have nevertheless been closer commercial, though not political, relations between the Lebanon and the Eastern bloc. There are signs of reviving trade in which, however, the British share does not seem likely to improve. The oil transit question remains unresolved but B.O.A.C. initiative and investment in Lebanese and Middle East civil aviation seem to promise well.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

### THE LEBANESE BUDGET FOR 1955

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received April 7)*

(No. 41 E. Confidential)

Beirut,

March 31, 1955.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translated extract from the Lebanese *Official Gazette* of the 2nd of March setting out the main details of the Lebanese budget which was recently passed by the Chamber of Deputies.

2. It is, perhaps, too soon to expect that the budget would give effect to the recommendations in the report which Mr. Shillito of Her Majesty's Treasury, presented to the Lebanese Minister of Finance at the end of 1954; and this year's budget is little more than an expanded version of that of 1954, on which I commented in my despatch No. 83 E. of the 19th of May, 1954.

3. As has been the case for several years now the budget shows an increase over the previous year's figures. This year the increase is somewhat larger than was expected. From £L.123.4 million the overall figure is now raised to £L.137.5 million, an increase of about 11 per cent. In 1954 the increase over the 1953 figure was 9 per cent. The biggest increase (£L.3.5 million) is in the provision for Public Works, bringing the allocation for this Ministry up to £L.22.6 million. The next largest increase (£L.3 million) is for Defence, bringing the allocation for that Ministry up to £L.23.9 million and preserving its position as the heaviest spending department.

4. The Lebanese are spending this year 16.7 per cent. of their estimated revenue on Defence, 16.4 per cent. on Public Works, 12.5 per cent. on Education and 11.2 per cent. on the Ministry of the Interior (making 27.9 per cent. in all on Security). There is also this year a large provision, of £L.12.1 million, for debts still due for payment.

5. On the revenue side of the account the largest quantitative increase is in indirect taxation, which is estimated to bring in £L.84.4 million (against £L.74.1 million last year). Direct taxation receipts are estimated at £L.34 million (against £L.31.2 million last year). The ratio is still rather surprising to the British mind.

6. The Lebanese budget remains an administrative exercise and is far from being a policy-making instrument. In a free economy such as the Lebanese, the budget can perhaps never be more than the reflection of the increasing activity and vitality of the economic and financial life of the country. The economy is still expanding and one member of the International Bank Mission to Lebanon at the end of last year told an officer in my Commercial Secretariat that the Mission estimated the real balance of Lebanon to be about £L.100 million surplus a year. Some of the increase in the amounts to be collected can perhaps be accounted for by greater efficiency among the tax collectors, but in general there is no tendency for the State to intervene in the economic life of the country.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Treasury, to Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, to Export Credits Guarantee Department and to the Head of the Middle East Office at Nicosia and I am passing a copy to the Head of Development Division here.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

TRANSLATED EXTRACT FROM LEBANESE OFFICIAL JOURNAL No. 9 OF MARCH 2, 1955

TABLE A

*Estimated Revenue*

	£L.	£L.
Direct taxes and duties ... ..	33,989,000	(31,238,000)
Indirect taxes and duties ... ..	82,350,000	(74,104,000)
Receipts from State properties and exploitation services ... ..	5,428,000	(5,240,000)
Miscellaneous revenue ... ..	15,733,000	(12,818,000)
Appropriation from Reserve Fund ...	p.m.	
<b>Total ...</b>	<b>137,500,000</b>	<b>(123,400,000)</b>

TABLE B

*Estimated Expenditure*

Presidency of the Republic ... ..	472,100	(520,400)
Chamber of Deputies ... ..	897,100	(874,000)
Presidency of the Council of Ministers ...	380,300	(391,400)
Ministry of Justice ... ..	4,351,100	(4,207,300)
Ministry of the Interior ... ..	16,360,440	(15,981,620)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants	5,874,000	(4,892,200)
Ministry of Finance ... ..	10,053,627	(10,054,900)
Ministry of National Defence ... ..	23,930,100	(20,920,900)
Ministry of Education and Fine Arts ...	17,382,407	(15,505,200)
Ministry of Public Health ... ..	6,767,795	(6,269,560)
Ministry of Social Affairs ... ..	1,957,225	(1,899,300)
Ministry of Information ... ..	1,295,000	(1,186,700)
Ministry of Public Works ... ..	22,599,660	(19,064,400)
Ministry of Agriculture ... ..	6,092,471	(6,132,300)
Ministry of National Economy ... ..	2,358,500	(2,218,300)
Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones ... ..	3,717,805	(3,716,200)
Ministry of Planning ... ..	371,920	(—)
Outstanding debts due for payment ...	12,149,400	(6,400,000)
Contingency Fund provision ... ..	489,050	(373,320)
Amortisation of Treasury bonds ... ..	—	(2,792,000)
<b>Total ...</b>	<b>137,500,000</b>	<b>(123,400,000)</b>

*N.B.*—1954 figures are given in brackets.

CONFIDENTIAL

VL 1051/14

No. 3

## REVIEW OF ANGLO-LEBANESE RELATIONS

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. (Received June 18)*

(No. 1042/1/55 G. Confidential)

Beirut,

June 6, 1955.

Dear Ivone,

In his letter ZP 9/2 of the 21st January, 1953, William Strang asked me to set forth, from time to time, my ideas concerning the most weighty factors involved in the relations between the United Kingdom and Lebanon. These I outlined under cover of my letter No. 1042/3/53 G of the 1st July, 1953.

2. Basic factors have not changed much in the interval and it seems to me that the present is not the time to make a new assessment. Meanwhile, I should say that we were not losing ground. On the contrary I think we are making some progress. We shall be able to speak with more assurance a year hence because in certain vital matters (military for example) we have not yet got down to brass tacks. Since I last reported, Britain's relations with the Middle East as a whole have improved; and the Lebanon must never be thought of except in this regional context. Strategically we now have an indisputable right to "reactivate" the Egyptian base for some years to come in certain defined circumstances. That is a fixed point in our relations with this country. Moreover, in so far as we are withdrawing from Egypt, we are building up in Cyprus, which is only just across the water. The stronger and more prepared we are in the Eastern Mediterranean, the more secure the Lebanese feel. As a result, therefore, of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty our basic position in Lebanon has improved. Similarly the reaffirmation of British interests in Iraq, Persia (oil) and the Gulf, have further strengthened our position here.

3. Since Britain has not yet reached the point of complete identity of interests with America and France in the Middle East we are naturally competing with these our friends and allies in the fields of commerce and general political influence. I think we are more than holding our own, partly for the reasons stated above and partly because we know more about and have a lighter yet more effective touch in the tactical handling of the local political situation. The President of the Lebanese Republic is our friend and although he is no Plato or Hercules he is as God made him. He trusts us and we manage one way and another to feed that trust. His Prime Ministers and Ministers and those who aspire to succeed him in the foreseeable future avoid giving us cause for offence and even, at times, try to earn good marks.

4. We are taking an increasing interest in this country and are not unsuccessfully trying to help them to help themselves. The continued presence here of the Royal Air Force training mission is of prime importance in this regard; and the hoped-for military talks, if held and successful, will further improve our chances. Commercially, we have made excellent progress in civil aviation and if other British concerns would follow the lead of the British Overseas Airways Corporation and the independent companies now associated with them and put out some "venture capital" backed by sound technologies, business acumen, efficiency in administration and ordinary British honesty, we could seize many golden opportunities.

5. As for Middle East oil, that element on which the safety of the Queen's Realm doth nowadays most chiefly depend, the Lebanon has lost none of its importance as a transit and pipeline terminal country. We are still negotiating with the Lebanese about the price of Tripoli refinery products and that position at present is unsatisfactory, but at least we are in better shape than we were two years ago, having overcome the obstacles that lay in the way of revising the general transit agreement.

6. On the whole then "Forward be our watchword," the only real question being what the Russians and their friends are up to. Their new motto out here seems to be "I will roar you as gently as any sucking dove" (Shakespeare).

Yours ever,

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

CONFIDENTIAL

VL 1016/8

No. 4

## REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE LEBANON

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Macmillan. (Received July 14)*(No. 92. Confidential)  
Sir,Beirut,  
July 8, 1955.

In my telegram No. 511 I reported that early Cabinet changes seemed probable. In this present despatch I have the honour to review the internal political situation here in more detail.

2. Government activity during the past six months has been mainly in the field of foreign policy despite the fact that the Prime Minister has been under continual pressure inside and outside the Chamber to carry through the administrative reforms for which he was granted special powers by Parliament and for which, indeed, the President of the Republic himself was brought to power nearly three years ago. Although popular discontent with the régime's failure to remedy existing abuses has not reached the pitch that characterised the summer of 1952, there is fairly general recognition of the fact that this is due not so much to any virtue there may be in the new régime as to the improved commercial and general economic situation and outlook. To many observers here it has appeared that the Government and particularly the President have turned the spotlight upon foreign affairs in order to distract public attention from their inability to cope with the thorny problem of reform beset as it is with so many personal considerations. During the past six months the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs have attended the Bandoeng Conference and visited several countries in the Far East. There have been State Visits to Italy and Turkey and the President of the Turkish Republic has paid a State Visit here. But the central feature has been the Turco-Iraqi Pact towards which from the first the Lebanese Government displayed a vacillating attitude despite the President's ready welcome and steady support. To the Lebanese public the story now seems one of rash initiative followed by gradual and inglorious retreat from support of the pact in mid-January to complete neutrality between it and the rival "Arab Pact" in mid-May. In the process the Government not only gave a handle for attack from Arab Nationalist and Communist elements but also lost support among the Maronites, the Phalange Party, pro-French elements generally and the majority of Sunni Moslems. All these saw or pretended to see in the pact the shadow of the Fertile Crescent. The pro-Western Elements asserted that they preferred their links with the West to be direct. The public attitude to the rapprochement with Turkey and the exchange of visits between the Presidents of the two countries was lukewarm. Meanwhile the interior administration remains lax, the courts corrupt, the police ineffectual and lawlessness rife in outlying mountain districts. Social reforms long overdue but which demand a moderate redistribution of wealth, remain a dead letter. No progress has been made with constructing a sensible system of democratic trade unions, or machinery however elementary for regulating industrial relations. It is symptomatic of a worsening situation that the Prime Minister has during the past month or two increasingly used his powers to suppress public criticism.

3. The first serious signs of crumbling in the present Cabinet (which is already old by Lebanese standards) appeared shortly after the departure of the Turkish President. The immediate issue was trivial enough. For some time the Government had been toying with the idea of a reshuffle of senior diplomatic and home civil service posts. In a country where personalities and personal loyalties and prejudices are more important than policies and individual merit, such a task was bound to cause stresses and strains. If the President had been a stronger character he would have made up his mind what was best for the country after consulting the Prime Minister and possibly other Ministers, and would have acted on his own responsibility. That was what his friends and most loyal supporters hoped he would do. That is what the country at large would have wished him to do. Instead, he let things drag on, in the hope of pleasing if not everybody, at least most. For some months the name of Moussa Mobarak (Personality No. 87) has been mentioned as that of a likely candidate for the Paris Embassy. Although M. Mobarak, now President of the Board of Customs and a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, was a loyal official under the French Mandate here and is

CONFIDENTIAL

commonly regarded as of *formation française*, he has at times been very outspoken in his criticism of the French. As a result it is commonly believed that the French Ambassador whispered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Alfred Naccache (who was President of the Lebanese Republic under the French Mandate) that, although he felt sure the French President would grant his *agrément* to any person whom the Lebanese President might nominate, it was hoped that Press reports concerning M. Moussa Mobarak's nomination would prove unfounded. In reply, M. Alfred Naccache is believed to have given the Ambassador his personal assurance that M. Mobarak would not be nominated. In this he is believed to have relied upon his own interpretation of his constitutional powers. With this interpretation, however, the President of the Republic did not agree. M. Naccache refused to nominate M. Mobarak and the Permanent Under-Secretary himself told me in confidence that he was present when the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that if M. Mobarak were nominated he himself would resign. The President had said nothing at the time, but had later issued a formal written instruction that the French President's *agrément* to the appointment of M. Mobarak was to be sought. Faced with this it was expected that M. Naccache would resign; but nothing of the sort. He considered that he was in the right, and within the next few days articles appeared in the French language Press, which is known to be under the influence of the French Embassy here, discussing the constitutional issue and coming down, though discreetly, against the President. M. Naccache meanwhile asserted, not publicly but openly in conversation, that he had decided not to resign, and not to recognise M. Mobarak's appointment either: it would be up to the President to dismiss him if he so wished, or for the Prime Minister to resign and a new Government to be formed. That is the position at present.

4. Simultaneously, partisan struggles have been joined about the application of the retirement age of 60 to the civil service and about the falling of consequential vacancies, particularly in the top grades. Appointments in the civil service from top to bottom have to be adjusted more or less to the set pattern of sectarian representation in Parliament and throughout the Public Service. The Directors-General enjoy more real power than the Ministers who are responsible for their Departments to Parliament, owing to the frequent changes of government and the preoccupation of politicians with political feuds and personal questions. Even now after six months and more of expectation, these higher civil service appointments have not been finally settled with the result that a *vis inertiae* has settled upon nearly all the Government Departments. This is now weighing heavily in the scale of popular discontent.

5. That stormy petrel, the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, chief of his so-called Socialist Party, something of an idealist, a student of Indian mysticism, an admirer of Nehru, an impractical man but one with some elemental force that can at the right moment produce fiery and persuasive revolutionary eloquence, the spearhead of the final attack on the old régime three years ago, has again sounded his clarion call. To forestall increasing pressure the Prime Minister has called an Extraordinary Session of the Chamber. As yet there has been no major engagement but an interpellation put down by a strong group headed by the former Prime Minister, Abdullah Yafi (Personality No. 130), on the exemption of new industries from taxation, may well raise the question of confidence and put the Government in peril.

6. Another sign of the times, reminiscent of the last weeks of the former régime, is the secret meetings now taking place between the political leaders of the Sunni Moslem community. These are Hussein Aweini (Personality No. 9), a wealthy merchant and entrepreneur in all senses of the word to the Saudi Royal Family (and incidentally King Saud's paymaster in the Lebanon), Sa'eb Salaam (No. 104), who was organised out of his seat in Parliament by the last revision of constituency boundaries, Abdullah Yafi and the present Prime Minister, and they have met twice recently to discuss the situation. The former régime was finally brought down, despite a strong parliamentary majority in favour of its continuance, by the refusal of all the Sunni leaders to form a Government. This is where the fixed sectarian pattern reveals the Achilles heel of any presidential régime in this country. If the Sunnis unite in revolt against the President, he has either to depart from established convention and call upon a non-Sunni to form a Government; or resign. To do the former he would need strong popular support, which, by definition, he lacks, otherwise the Sunnis would not be so foolish as to unite against him. When therefore one sees the eagles gathering together, one can be sure that

CONFIDENTIAL

there the carcass is. It will, moreover, be recalled (see my despatch No. 54 of the 11th of March, 1954) that President Chamoun was reluctant to summon Sami Solh to form a Government because of his known obstinacy in quitting office, once in. His co-religionists are as aware of this as is the President and they are by no means above using him, if they think the moment propitious, to bring down the régime and thereby secure a new deal. Their desire to do this in the present case has undoubtedly been heightened by the fact that all Sunnis at heart in this country feel stronger ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia than with Syria and Iraq, and have therefore been against Lebanese accession to the pact.

7. The general picture presents itself to me thus in outline, but it would be a mistake to paint it in too sombre colours. Danger for the régime there certainly is but immediate danger definitely not. Public criticism and opposition to the régime have not yet found coherent expression largely because of the commercial prosperity of the country already referred to, noticeably absent during the summer of 1952 when Lebanese merchants were going bankrupt one after the other through over-stocking in anticipation of the Korean conflict spreading to Europe, and partly because there is no obvious alternative to President Chamoun as Head of State. Three years ago Camille Chamoun, the leader of a small parliamentary minority in a packed Chamber, seemed an angel of light by comparison with Sheikh Bechara el Khoury, at whose feet all the ills of the country were laid in the belief that his indulgence towards members of his family had turned the Lebanon into a private farm. Such is by no means the case to-day. If President Chamoun were for one reason or another to disappear, no one could say who would succeed him. The runner-up at the time of his own election, Hamid Frangié (Personality No. 42) is not popular. His clan, moreover, are at present engaged in a minor shooting war, arising from a blood feud, in North Lebanon. He speaks only French and is thought by many to be something of a French agent, though the French Embassy do not foster this belief but on the contrary make no secret of their misgivings about him. If, therefore, the Sunni leaders should unite against the present President, they will, I think, hesitate before forcing the issue lest they open the door to popular agitation not only against the President (who, after all, represents stability and straightforward dealing, weak as his actions too often are) but also against the sectarian structure of political society, which in turn would mean the emergence of half-baked political parties, among which the Communists, some wearing the mask of Arab Nationalists, would be the most vociferous, the best organised, if not the strongest.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Jeddah, Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

VL 1016/9

No. 5

SAMI SOLH'S NEW GOVERNMENT

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Macmillan. (Received July 14)*

(No. 93. Confidential)  
Sir,

Beirut,  
July 11, 1955.

With reference to my telegram No. 516 of the 10th of July, and my despatch No. 92 of the 8th of July, regarding Cabinet changes here, I have the honour to report that the new Government was finally constituted late on the 9th of July as follows, the names of the new Ministers being underlined:—

Sami Solh: Prime Minister and Minister for Planning (Personality No. 116).

Gabriel Murr: Vice-Premier and Minister for Justice and for Public Health (Personality No. 91).

Hamid Frangié: Minister for Foreign Affairs (Personality No. 42).

Muhieddin Nsouly: Minister for the Interior and Information (Personality No. 96).

Pierre Eddé: Minister for Finance (Personality No. 39).

Rashid Karamé: Minister for National Economy and Social Affairs (Personality No. 66).

Naim Moghabghab: Minister for Public Works (see my despatch No. 160 of the 18th of September, 1954).

Selim Lahoud: Minister for Education (Personality No. 80).

Selim Haïdar: Minister for Agriculture and Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones (Personality No. 48).

Emir Magid Arslan: Minister for Defence (Personality No. 13).

2. All three new Ministers are definitely of *formation française*, not one of them speaking more than a few words of English. On individual merit, they bring a much needed intellectual quality to the Council Chamber. Moreover by consenting to serve with one another, the three new men seem to symbolise increased cohesion. Hitherto the Eddés and the Lahouds have been in opposing camps and Hamid Frangié, a man of ability, though his ways be dark, has been chary of forming alliances and has, in fact, since he relinquished Ministerial office six years ago, taken the limelight only once, when he was runner-up at the Presidential election in September 1952.

3. Another feature of these changes is that they affect only the Maronites in the Cabinet so that the fixed sectarian pattern imposed by convention remains undisturbed, though there has been a reshuffle. The Portfolio of Finance has passed from Muhieddin Nsouly, a Sunni, to Pierre Eddé, a Maronite who held it until the fall of the Abdullah Yafi Cabinet in March 1954.

4. One is tempted to surmise that this closing of the Maronite ranks is a direct consequence of the implied threat from the Sunnis referred to in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 92; and so it may be, to some extent. Certain it is that the three new Ministers, despite disparities of age, are possible future candidates for the Presidency; certain also that the question of who is to succeed President Chamoun is being actively considered even though, if the President lasts his normal tour, he has still three years to go. It would, however, be wrong to read too much into this present change as affecting the succession to the Presidency. So far as Hamid Frangié is concerned, his immediate motive in accepting office is undoubtedly to restore his prestige and influence in North Lebanon, where his clan are involved in a blood feud. His reputation in the country generally needs refurbishing and despite the risks of taking office to any politician's reputation in this country, M. Frangié evidently feels that in his case at present they are worthwhile. In regard to Pierre Eddé, his terms undoubtedly were Finance or nothing because his reputation would be adversely affected if he were to accept a less important Ministry. How he will fare in the Chamber at the hands of Emile Bustani and his small group remains to be seen for it will be recalled that it was M. Bustani who hounded him out last time (my despatch No. 44 of the 24th of February, 1954); but M. Eddé is trusted by the Maronite Old Guard, notably the reactionary clergy, so it was necessary for the President and Prime



Minister to make concessions to get him into the Cabinet in the place of M. Alfred Naccache. Both M. Naccache and M. Eddé's father were Presidents of the Lebanese Republic under the French Mandate. As for Selim Lahoud, at the time of his selection for Cabinet rank, he was *en route* to the United States by air on business for the Litani Board and the general belief is that he was not even consulted. As a young Deputy who entered Parliament through a by-election little more than a year ago, he will be flattered and will doubtless accept though he has his hands full already with the Presidency of the Litani Board and other public and private affairs. Office for him will mean the sacrifice, temporarily no doubt, of a substantial income from his commercial enterprises.

5. How long the present team will last is doubtful. Neither M. Frangié nor M. Pierre Eddé is particularly easy to get along with and although the intention of the President is believed to be that they should hold together for four or five months, my own feeling is that such harmony as exists at present will not last so long.

6. On balance, therefore, my conclusion is that although these present changes look at first sight like an accession of strength for the President, they are in the long run more likely to prove the contrary.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

VL 1016/10

No. 6

DEBATE IN THE LEBANESE CHAMBER PRECEDING THE VOTE OF  
CONFIDENCE FOR SAMI SOLH'S NEW GOVERNMENT

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Macmillan. (Received July 21)*

(No. 100. Confidential)

*Beirut.*

Sir,

*July 18, 1955.*

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 93 dated the 11th of July, 1955, and to report that M. Sami Solh's new Government was accorded a vote of confidence on the 14th of July by 22 votes to 11, with two abstentions and several deliberate absences.

2. On the insistence of the Opposition Deputy Emile Boustani, the whole debate, and not merely the Prime Minister's address, was broadcast. The Press comments next day suggest that the experiment will probably not be repeated by this Government.

3. I enclose a summary of the Prime Minister's statement.<sup>(1)</sup> The general tone of it was that in the period of prosperity through which the Lebanon is passing the Government and the Chamber must work together to maintain this favourable situation and even improve it. To this end a number of measures were proposed, none of which was objectionable or very controversial, but none of which, on the other hand, bore the marks of a new approach to the problems which contributed to the fall of the previous Cabinet. In the realm of foreign policy the Government would continue to promote Arab unity, cultivate good relations with Syria as a starting point towards this unity, and support the United Nations.

4. The Opposition attack was opened by Emile Boustani, who evidently has no love for a Government containing Pierre Eddé and found its programme wide open to punches. Very cleverly, having secured at the beginning that the debate should be broadcast, he launched a series of accusations of corruption and nepotism, backed with a wealth of quotation of individual instances of a kind admirably chosen to catch the imagination of the listening public. He condemned the Government as a mere patched-up job which remained bound within the same cramping political and moral framework of its predecessor; and criticised the three new Ministers for accepting office. The succeeding Opposition speakers reinforced this attack with instances of their own, and the Government, caught ill-prepared, was feeble in its replies. Eddé was conspicuously silent.

5. The only contribution of merit from the Government benches was from Hamid Frangié, and was on foreign policy. In reply to an attack by Kamal Joublatt on the Government's tolerance of the Parti Populaire Syrien, and to his advocacy of the proposed Saudi-Syro-Egyptian Pact, Frangié made an energetic and able speech in which in effect he accused the previous Government of having, in the field of foreign affairs, only succeeded in worsening relations between the Lebanon and the Arab countries, and said that his first task would be to direct his efforts towards an improvement, to begin with, of relations between the Lebanon and Syria. He promised to consult with the Syrian leaders on the issues between the two countries.

6. A passage of ill-omen both for British interests and for prospects of a Government with the courage to fulfil its policies, began with a long intervention by Abdullah Yafi accusing the previous Government of signing with the Iraq Petroleum Company an agreement on oil revenues which surrendered the Lebanon's just rights. The Prime Minister returned a soft answer; he was prepared to submit the agreement to the new Ministers—*i.e.*, Frangié and Eddé—and, if they considered it was not favourable to Lebanese interests, to submit it to the Chamber for discussion. Frangié himself added that he agreed with Yafi that such agreements should not be signed by the Government without discussion in the Chamber.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

7. When at the end of the day the Government won its vote of confidence, it had certainly little to congratulate itself on. Of the two abstainers, Yafi is no friend of a Solh Government. Of the absentees at the time of voting, Joumblatt and at least one other are firmly of the Opposition. Of the votes for the Government, on the other hand, nine were those of the Ministers themselves. The true bilan of support outside the Cabinet itself is a maximum of 21 in favour and at least 13 against. What is more, several of the Opposition made it clear that their criticism was not of the new Ministers but of the old Government. Finally the showing of the Government as a whole, and particularly of the the Government apart from the new Ministers, was poor.

8. The Press, having already criticised the new Government for being so very like the old, did not approach the debate with any great sympathy. Nor was it impressed by the vote of confidence; several papers emphasised that it was only won as a result of Hamid Frangié's statement of foreign policy, whereas the Prime Minister's own statements had made no contribution to confidence at all. Frangié and Eddé were widely said to be the only hope for the Government's survival, and *Beirut*, organ of the Minister of Information and of the Interior, was almost alone in believing that the new Government would succeed where previous ones had failed.

9. The new Government appears to have been considerably shaken by its reception, and to be bestirring itself to produce measures which will restore its position. I am, however, confirmed in the feeling expressed in my previous despatch referred to above, that such harmony as exists at present is unlikely to last long.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris and to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Nicosia.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

VL 1016/13

No. 7

REPORT ON A SPEECH BY PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN AT  
THE VILLAGE OF DEIR EL KAMAR

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Macmillan. (Received August 18)*

(No. 116. Confidential)

*Beirut.*

Sir,

*August 11, 1955.*

I have the honour to report that President Camille Chamoun, in accordance with a practice which he began in the summer of 1952, made last week-end an important political speech at Deir el Kamar. This mountain village, not far from the Presidential summer palace at Beit-ed-Dine, in the midst of a region where about half the inhabitants are Maronites and the other half Druzes, is President Chamoun's birth-place, and it was there, four years ago, when he was leader of a small Parliamentary Opposition, that, backed by the Druze leader Kamal Joumblatt, he launched a campaign that led a few weeks later to the collapse of the Bechara el Khoury régime and his own election as President of the Republic. The President has taken the opportunity of each succeeding anniversary to render unofficially and to the people of the Lebanon an account of his stewardship and his future plans.

2. In 1953 the text of his discourse was the need to amend the laws; in 1954 the rights, privileges and public duties of the Lebanese *vis-à-vis* their religious communities and the State as a whole; and now, the need to create wealth in the Lebanon itself by development projects. This year, however, there runs throughout the speech a note almost of apologia. The President seems to be on the defensive. He protests too much. I enclose a summary of his speech.

3. These incursions of his Excellency into the political arena have not passed unnoticed in the Press or in the country at large. While there is general agreement that the President under the Lebanese Constitution is the ultimate "responsible au pouvoir" and therefore has a right to talk politics, the consensus of more thoughtful opinion is that it is unwise for him to swim against the current flowing in the direction of modern Western democratic practice, which places the Head of State above politics and political responsibility upon the shoulders of his Ministers alone.

4. I have called attention in my annual reports and in previous despatches to this fundamental question of the Presidential powers and to President Chamoun's failure to carry through the aims of the so-called Revolution of September 1952, of which one of the most important was to trim these powers and to get them into proper balance with Parliament. The inward significance of the resignation of M. Alfred Naccache from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (my despatch No. 92 (1014/2/27/55) of the 8th of July, 1955) can be seen in the light of this constitutional problem. The Minister, himself a former President of the Republic (though under the French Mandate) and a leading jurist, considered that he alone had the constitutional right, as the Minister responsible, to nominate Ministers and Ambassadors abroad. It was President Chamoun's refusal to accept this (though admittedly the real difference between them was on other grounds) that led to M. Naccache's resignation.

5. To make the President's position even worse, it is no secret that he has during the past few weeks been in open dispute with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Chehab. The two have never really seen eye to eye, though when the President came to power he acknowledged privately that he owed the event more to General Chehab than to anyone else because it was the General who, as acting Head of State, held the scales during the interregnum and did not succumb to the temptation to let the interregnum continue indefinitely or alternatively to run for the Presidency himself. Certain it is that General Chehab enjoys great prestige in this country; certain also that only he is capable of holding the Armed Forces together as a cohesive body and a reliable instrument. This was clearly seen when reports of his intending or even proffered resignation became current last week. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Salem, at once started canvassing

support for himself, going so far as to solicit my good offices with the President of the Republic. Groups of junior officers also got together with their various candidates and it was soon evident that if General Chehab should in fact retire, the scales of ultimate political justice in this country would for some considerable time and during perhaps a critical juncture be hopelessly out of balance. General Chehab, recognising this himself, first withdrew his resignation then, before this was generally known, sent for all senior officers down to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and addressed them to the effect that whatever his own intentions may have been in regard to retirement, he had been disappointed and shocked by the reactions of Army officers to the various reports which had been current. He had hoped that he had taught the Army the lesson of keeping out of politics and of disciplined obedience to command. The Army was not a company that elected its chairman but a fighting force that could only operate if it obeyed orders. He had decided to remain on in command if only to complete the task he had set himself, and which he had mistakenly thought he had succeeded in already, of making the Army a service the State could be proud of. The universal reaction of the Press to this episode has been favourable to General Chehab. The obverse of this has been a general reflection on the régime in which the President has inevitably suffered. "What are we coming to," asked the papers, "when the strongest and most upright of our public servants finds himself constrained to resign?"

6. When my Oriental Secretary saw the President for a few moments on the 3rd of August, his Excellency, in reply to a brief question whether the reports about General Chehab's impending resignation were true, said "I shall not let him resign." Next, when Mr. Arab asked whether his Excellency had any message for me, he replied "Tell the Ambassador I want arms!" This is an oblique reference to the question dealt with in the correspondence resting with my telegram to you No. 14 Saving of the 21st of July. But it also shows that the President believes his position would be stronger with General Chehab if he could show some positive results of his consistent advocacy of a foreign policy more closely aligned with our own. The General, though by no means a francophile, and certainly not anti-British either, is of "formation française," has a French wife, and is a convinced believer in the French policy of the *status quo* in the Middle East, which in fact means that in the "Battle of the Pacts" he is against us. In this general attitude he now has the strong support of the two strongest Ministers in the present administration, namely the new Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, M. Hamid Frangié and M. Pierre Eddé.

7. Although therefore Parliament is in recess until the 3rd of September, the equinoctial gales are beginning to blow again round the Presidential chair. On balance the President's position has again suffered. His foreign policy, which was the result of a sincere effort on his part to keep in step with us, has suffered a setback. Through his ineffectual incursions on to the internal political scene he has brought even more people, who have hitherto reserved judgment, round to the view that he is not really the man for the job. Hence the strength of the current towards a "non-responsible" Head of State. Unfortunately, as someone said to me the other day, the President is regarded throughout this country as "etoffe anglaise" and with his decline our own prestige will to some extent suffer.

8. We would be well advised therefore to consider the consequences for ourselves. In my despatch No. 92 I reported that there was no obvious alternative to President Chamoun as Head of the Lebanese State. Events since the reshuffle of the Solh Cabinet have led me to modify this opinion somewhat. The new Foreign Minister, Hamid Frangié, was the only member of the new Cabinet who shone in its first appearances before the Chamber. He is the only member who has since been active and with some appearance of success. While the Prime Minister has visited Saudi Arabia and come back, by all accounts, with his nose out of joint and without paying his expected visit to Cairo, Frangié has instituted a series of exchanges with the Syrian Foreign Minister, and between the Foreign Affairs Committees of the two Parliaments, which are generally accepted as evidence of the closer rapprochement he promised when he took office. Nor must it be forgotten that it was only after a neck-and-neck race with Frangié that Chamoun was elected President in 1952: or that Frangié is an ambitious man who has been in the wilderness since then and who appears to have chosen the occasion of the recent crisis to make a determined come-back.

9. There are, it seems, two currents at work, possibly opposed ones. One is towards a weakening of the Presidency, the other towards a change of President. A strong Presidency is a natural enough phenomenon in this part of the world; it compensates for the weakness of elected Governments. But a weak President can destroy the Presidency itself in a Westernised country like the Lebanon where democratic government may not function perfectly but where it is genuinely preferred by the people at large to any other system.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and of its enclosure to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Washington, and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Nicosia.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

Enclosure

Summary of a speech made by his Excellency the President of the Republic of Lebanon at Deir el Kamar on the 6th of July, 1955

The President introduced his speech as the continuance of a tradition, whose theme this year would be not politics but economic and social development. The "responsables au pouvoir," he said, expected no thanks. They did not ask for silence from "demagogues short of followers" nor beg "professional pessimists" to "abate their counterfeit anguish" (these phrases have been strongly resented by the Press and the Parliamentary Opposition). They simply tried to do their duty, and the figures would speak loudest in their defence.

The President then recited statistics to show the progress since 1952 of the national income, balance of payments, customs receipts, number of tourists, national budget, and strength of currency. (These were impressive but were taken unfairly out of their context. Whatever the effects of the "Revolution"—and it would be difficult to separate them out—the Lebanese economy has been steadily expanding since 1949, as the Press and Opposition were quick to point out.)

Private enterprise, went on the President, had made the Lebanon one great nursery of industry and agriculture. The Government on its part had set itself two tasks—the building up of the Army and the development of major projects of reconstruction and public utilities; partly from its own resources, partly with the help of the United States and private enterprise. He listed the ten major utilities projects (schools, &c.) and, as "reconstruction" projects, the existing four-year irrigation plan which was to be followed by a second; the port of Tripoli; the free zone and port of Beirut; the Litani hydro-electric scheme; and the extension of the road network and international highways.

The Lebanon was, he said, only at the beginning of the road of economic development. The development of social services had barely been tackled as yet. But now that economic development and the national wealth had been put on a firm footing, social services should receive attention and the 1957 and later budgets should be very largely devoted to them. The State should contribute equally with local organisations. Before long the workers should be assured of a minimum standard of life, health, food, comfort and contentment.

VL 1016/17

No. 8

## THE RESIGNATION OF SAMI SOLH'S GOVERNMENT

*Mr. Scott to Mr. Macmillan. (Received September 17)*

(No. 135. Confidential)

*Beirut,*

Sir,

*September 15, 1955.*

1 reported in my telegram No. 684 of the 14th of September that the Government of M. Sami Solh had resigned. I now have the honour to give some account of the events leading up to this and of the efforts of the President to form a new Government.

2. An extraordinary—in both senses of the word—session of the Chamber of Deputies was held on Tuesday, the 13th of September. Twenty-eight out of the forty-four deputies were present and, after some routine business had been transacted, questions were put to the Prime Minister on the reasons for the resignation of MM. Frangié and Eddé last week. This started a tumult of mutual recriminations and abuse: M. Eddé demanded that the Chamber discuss the allegations of his former colleague, M. Murr, that he had agreed to an inflated price to buy out the Beirut Electricity Company; the Prime Minister was hotly attacked on his alleged decision, which he denied having made, to recommend the dissolution of the Chamber; M. Bustani added his loud voice to the other demands for the resignation of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister and his predecessor in office, M. Abdullah Yafi, then engaged in a verbal duel of the "I did"—"you didn't" type which rose in the end to a crescendo of shouting and abuse in the course of which many unparliamentary expressions were bandied about amidst interruptions, catcalls and shouts. M. Yafi even threatened at one point that if the Chamber were dissolved the present régime would cease to exist.

3. One by one the Ministers started announcing their individual resignations. First M. Rashid Keramé (Personality No. 67) after a moderate statement of his position, left the Government benches and went over to take his seat in the body of the Chamber. He was followed by M. Selim Lahoud and then M. Selim Haidar who, however, simply left the Government benches and took another seat, leaving everyone in some (but not much) doubts as to whether he had resigned or not. Of the rump of the Cabinet left, M. Nsouli (perhaps because he had no other seat to go to, not being a member of the Chamber) stayed where he was along with M. Murr. The Prime Minister left the Chamber altogether and the Speaker tried to follow him after announcing that a debate on the vote of confidence would be taken on another occasion. This manoeuvre, however, was not successful. The Speaker was seized by four members and, with more than a token show of resistance, returned to his Chair. In doing so he ousted the Deputy Speaker who had taken possession of it and was hammering on the table with the gavel to announce that the session would continue under his presidency.

4. Finally, this ignominious sitting petered out to an indeterminate end. In the evening M. Sami Solh presented the resignation of his Cabinet to the President who accepted it and at once began consultations to form a new Ministry. At the time of writing this despatch the President is still so engaged: he is taking his time about it, perhaps to let tempers cool off, and left Beirut for North Lebanon to spend a day and a half fulfilling engagements previously arranged.

5. It has now become known that M. Sami Solh tried twice in the course of last weekend to hand in the resignation of his Government. The President, however, would not accept it, telling him on the second occasion that he must remain in office until the Moslem Congress (reported in Chancery letter No. 1014/2/57/55 of the 14th of September to Levant Department) was over. On that occasion also (the day before the decisive meeting of the Chamber on the 13th of September) the Speaker assured M. Sami Solh that only routine matters already on the agenda of the Chamber would be dealt with the following day. It was on this understanding that M. Sami Solh agreed to withhold his resignation and meet the Chamber. The Speaker's failure to control the members the next day has therefore resulted in a serious loss of prestige to M. Sami Solh, which would have been avoided if either his resignation had been accepted or the Speaker

CONFIDENTIAL

had been able to keep control of the Chamber. M. Sami Solh is therefore in a very disgruntled frame of mind and is talking in terms of forcing the President by one means or another to dissolve the Chamber.

6. The President will see M. Sami Solh to-day and is expected to offer him a chance of forming a new Government. M. Sami Solh can only accept this opportunity if he can get the President's agreement to dissolve the Chamber and order new elections if he fails to form a Government. This would be a risky manoeuvre for the President as the events of this week have re-established in the popular mind the power and prestige of the Chamber and a dissolution in order to keep M. Sami Solh in power would be widely interpreted as a dictatorial act and could have dangerous consequences for the President himself. The President has already sounded 32 of the 44 Deputies, and the majority of these are in favour of having M. Rachid Keramé as Prime Minister. It is not likely, however, that a Cabinet headed by M. Keramé could last long because the post of Prime Minister is traditionally regarded as reserved for a Sunni Moslem from the capital, whereas M. Keramé represents Tripoli. A second possibility as Prime Minister is M. Sa'eb Salaam (Personality No. 106) who at the moment is not a Deputy although he is a former Prime Minister. But it is idle to speculate further on the possible developments which I shall report as they occur.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Baghdad, B.M.E.O., Cairo, Damascus, Jeddah and Tel Aviv.

I have, &amp;c.

I. D. SCOTT

*(Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires).*

CONFIDENTIAL

VL 1016/20

No. 9

## FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT BY RACHID KARAME

*Mr. Scott to Mr. Macmillan. (Received September 22)*

(No. 142. Confidential)

Sir,

Beirut,

September 20, 1955.

I have the honour to state (as reported in my telegram No. 697 of to-day) that M. Rachid Karamé has finally, after four days of intensive negotiation, succeeded in forming a Ministry. I enclose as an appendix to this despatch a list of the new Cabinet, together with brief biographical notes on those members of it who are not in the current (1955) list of Leading Personalities in the Lebanon.

2. As expected (paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 135) the President sent first for the outgoing Prime Minister, M. Sami Solh, and asked him to form a new Ministry. M. Sami Solh refused because the attitude of the Deputies in the Chamber made it impossible for him to accept office again for the present. Next, the President called on M. Rachid Karamé, who was recommended to him as Prime Minister by a majority of the Deputies whom he consulted. M. Karamé has now succeeded in his task but his new Ministry, although doubtless able to command a majority in the Chamber, has had for various reasons a lukewarm public reception. The personality of the Prime Minister, apart from his youth and inexperience, is not either strong or popular; he is stubborn and vain and his principal claim to fame is that he is the son of his father. Secondly, most people had hoped and expected that the President would have used the powers which he has under the Constitution to select a strong team to meet the needs of the moment. Instead, he has left the whole initiative in forming the Cabinet to a man of the poor calibre of the new Prime Minister. It may be that the reason why the President acted as he did is that he was reluctant to form a strong combination of Ministers which would necessarily have had to include MM. Frangié and Eddé, to whom the President—probably rightly—attributes the desire to overthrow the régime, including himself. Thirdly, the general level of the Ministers is certainly no higher than that of their predecessors, whereas an improvement had been widely hoped for and there is corresponding general disappointment.

3. Nothing is yet known of the programme of the new Cabinet; but the Leftish tendencies of the Prime Minister are well known. It was he, for instance, who last year signed the permit authorising the sale (via Lebanese interests) of two Swedish tankers to Poland. Also, he has just returned from a tour of Eastern Europe impressed by the possibilities of trade with the Satellites. He is also believed to be much influenced by an uncle in Tripoli who is a well-known Communist. M. Karamé is known as an advocate of economic union with Syria; if he pursues this policy while in his present office he will run into serious opposition from the majority of the Christians in the Lebanon. He is also well known for being in favour of drastic revision of the existing oil agreements with the Iraq Petroleum Company and the American Tapline Company. It is not likely, however, that his Ministry will last very long. M. Karamé himself is far from having full support even in Tripoli which he represents in the Chamber. It is quite possible that the events leading to his ultimate downfall may begin there.

4. The President has not enhanced his reputation by his handling of this crisis. He would have inspired respect and established his position more firmly if he had used to advantage the constitutional powers which he has and selected a strong Ministry which the country needs. He has made no attempt to do so, while at the same time he interferes in small things—like minor appointments and contracts—which he ought to leave to his Ministers.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office and to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Paris and Washington.

I have, &amp;c.

I. D. SCOTT

*(Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires).*

CONFIDENTIAL

## APPENDIX

- M. Rachid Karamé.*—Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Minister of Planning (Personalities List No. 66).
- M. Fouad Ghosn.*—Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. Born about 1912, Greek Orthodox of Koura district (North Lebanon). Son of late Nicolas Ghosn who was several times a Deputy and once the Vice-Speaker. Married. French education. Lacks character; protects Communism in his district, not out of conviction but for electoral purposes.
- M. Salim Lahoud.*—Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrés. (Personalities List No. 80.)
- Emir Jamil Chehab.*—Minister of Finance. (Personalities List No. 33.)
- Emir Megid Arslan.*—Minister of Defence. (Personalities List No. 13.)
- M. Jamil Mikaoui.*—Minister of Public Works. (Personalities List No. 86.)
- M. Kazem El-Khalil.*—Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and Minister of Social Affairs. Shiah Moslem of Tyr (South Lebanon) born about 1900. Educated at the American University of Beirut. Several times elected a Deputy and a former Minister of Public Health. Has a well-established reputation for corruption. Married.
- M. Nazih Bizri.*—Minister of Public Health and Minister of National Economy. Born about 1915. Sunni Moslem of Sidon. Doctor of Medicine, educated at the American University of Beirut. Elected for the first time Deputy in 1953. Lacks personality and character; has not taken any active part in recent debates. Married.
- M. Georges Akl.*—Minister of Education and Minister of Information. Maronite lawyer. Born 1905. French education. Former Secretary-General to *Bloc National* (Eddé's group) which he later broke with. Married.
- M. Joseph Skaf.*—Minister of Agriculture. Greek Catholic from Zahlé, Bekaa. Born about 1923. The illegitimate son of late Elias Thomé Skaf who was some years a Deputy in the time of the French mandate. Large landowner. Primary education only; easily led and amenable to flattery. Leads the Bekaa group of five deputies in the Chamber. Has had various matrimonial adventures.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEBATE IN THE CHAMBER OF THE NEW LEBANESE  
GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT OF POLICY

*Mr. Scott to Mr. Macmillan. (Received October 10)*

(No. 148. Confidential)  
Sir,

Beirut,  
October 5, 1955.

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 739 of the 5th of October, 1955, reporting that the Cabinet formed by M. Rashid Keramé on the 19th of September received a vote of confidence yesterday in the Lebanese Chamber by 30 votes to 7.

2. By tacit agreement, after the unfortunate experiences of M. Sami Solh (reported in Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews' despatch No. 100 of the 18th of July) when he presented his Cabinet to the Chamber, neither the governmental policy statement nor the ensuing debate was broadcast. The Egyptian Ambassador and the visiting Egyptian Minister for Waqfs were in the gallery of the Chamber and the Deputies were clearly very conscious of their presence and watchful of their reactions.

3. In M. Keramé's statement foreign policy took pride of place. The main points of interest were his proposals for a new Arab Pact, a joint stand with Syria on the oil agreements and the resumption of economic discussions with Syria which would lead to economic union between the two countries. In domestic matters the programme included little new except a proposal to submit to the Chamber during the next Ordinary Session a measure of electoral reform involving an increase in the number of Deputies. A fuller summary of the policy statement is attached.

4. In that part of his statement which dealt with foreign affairs the Prime Minister promised to work for a new pact which would group all the Arab countries although without involving them in any obligations towards non-Arab countries which individual members might have undertaken. He was subsequently criticised, notably by Abdallah Yafi, a former Prime Minister, and Kamal Jumblatt, for the vagueness of this statement and was urged to declare openly his opposition to all pacts with Western countries and his support of the projected Tripartite Arab Pact. In his closing reply M. Keramé insisted that the Lebanon had not been invited to join such a pact but added that nor had the Lebanon any interest in concluding agreements with non-Arab States. The many expressions of antagonism to Western alliances which were made in the debate won general applause.

5. Two questions not mentioned in the policy statement figured largely in the subsequent discussions: the Johnston Plan and the recent decision of Egypt to buy arms from Communist countries. Emile Bustani was followed by others, including Abdallah Yafi, in attacking the Johnston Plan. M. Keramé in his reply promised to abide by the decision of the Chamber, though it was not made clear whether he meant the previous adverse decision or some future decision. Bechir Awar (Druze) and Adib Ferzli (Greek Orthodox) led the support of Egypt's decision on arms purchases, Ferzli likening the Egyptian Prime Minister to a new Saladin; and Abdallah Yafi demanded that the Chamber should formally congratulate Nasser. After the session had begun to disperse, Deputies were called back and a slightly depleted House passed on a snap vote a resolution to this effect. Snap vote or no, it certainly reflected at any rate the superficial sentiments of the Chamber.

6. No mention was made, except by implication, of Mr. Dulles' statement.

7. In reply to questions on the oil agreements M. Keramé recalled that he was the only Minister in M. Sami Solh's Government not to approve the agreements, and promised to open new negotiations with the companies.

8. Discussion of the domestic programme of the Government was limited, perhaps because attention was focused on foreign affairs, perhaps because no one had much faith in the ability of this Government to carry out what it promised. Neither MM. Frangié nor Eddé, whose resignations caused the fall of the previous Government, nor the topics on which they ostensibly resigned, were prominent in the debate. M. Frangié's influence, however, is reflected in the virtual adoption by the new Prime Minister of the policy he followed as Foreign Minister in the outgoing Government.

9. Technically speaking, M. Keramé's performance was good and his majority was much more comfortable than that of the former Cabinet. Those who voted against him were the inveterate Opposition such as Kamal Jumblatt and Joseph Chader and those who for reasons of private ambition are out of countenance. MM. Frangié and Bustani abstained and M. Sami Solh absented himself, undoubtedly on account of his resentment at the way in which the Chamber had treated him on the occasion of the fall of his Cabinet.

10. The Press has, however, given the vote only a very lukewarm reception, mostly because it has a very poor opinion of the new Government's competence.

11. Although M. Keramé has avoided committing himself irrevocably on any major issue in a sense unacceptable to us, the general tenor of his pronouncements in the field of foreign policy is unsympathetic towards the West. In itself this would not necessarily need to cause as much concern, for neither he nor his Cabinet are of the stuff to follow strong policies in the face of any opposition, and they are likely to fare indifferently in matters of domestic concern. On foreign policy, however, M. Keramé reflects a general feeling in the Chamber against the West; and for the moment the Chamber is playing an unusually active part in the direction of Lebanese policy. The corrective to this should be the President, whom we can rely upon to hold sensible views in this sphere. The President's character and the diminution in his prestige over the past few months make it uncertain how far we can count on his support against the declared policy of the new Government.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Washington, Paris, the Head of B.M.E.O. and Levant Department in the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

I. D. SCOTT.  
(*Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires*)

## APPENDIX

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

VL 1902/1

No. 11

## LEBANON: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 28)*

(No. 49. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
 Sir, *April 25, 1955.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on Heads of Foreign Missions accredited to the Lebanon.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

## Enclosure

**Argentina**

Sr. Carlos Zamboni, Ambassador (January 5, 1955).

M. Zamboni is the first Argentine representative here to hold rank as Ambassador. He is a professional diplomatist who has already had six or seven years' service in the Middle East and the impression I formed of him during our exchange of visits is of a quite well-informed and shrewd observer. The new Ambassador is married and has, I think, two young children.

**Austria**

Dr. Kurt Farbowsky, Chargé d'Affaires (March 16, 1955).

Dr. Farbowsky is Chargé d'Affaires *sur pied*, accredited to Syria and Iraq as well as Lebanon. He was previously in the Foreign Ministry at Vienna and before that at Brussels. He has never visited England but speaks some English. He is married.

**Belgium**

M. Fernand Seynaeve, Minister (August 13, 1952).

\*A friendly, middle-aged man of wide experience outside the Middle East, mostly consular; his interests mainly economic. A charming wife. Both speak English and, I am sure, like us. (Written in 1953.)

**Brazil**

M. F. Gualberto de Oliveira, Ambassador (January 25, 1955).

M. Oliveira, who is the first Brazilian representative here to hold rank as Ambassador, was previously, I understand, a senior administrative official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro. He is married and has one married daughter.

**Chile**

Sr. Miguel Laban Jabaz, Minister (July 14, 1953). Also accredited to Syria.

\*Of Syrian origin, being the son of an emigrant who prospered exceedingly. Reputed to be wealthy. Speaks only Arabic and Spanish. Friendly, quiet and gentle in manner; in the late forties. Prefers to call himself Laban, omitting the Jabaz altogether. Wife rather reserved but quite friendly. She speaks a little French. (Written in 1954.)

**Colombia**

Dr. Rodolfo Garcia Garcia, Minister (June 14, 1949).

\*Never seen except at Diplomatic Corps gatherings where he huddles together with the other South Americans. (Written in 1954.)

**Czechoslovakia**

M. C. Herold, Minister (June 18, 1954).

M. Herold is a comparatively young man, tall, fair and good appearance. Unlike all other Communists I have met he appears to have a happy disposition and seems most anxious to be pleasing and friendly, asking my advice frankly about a number of points of protocol in his relations with the Diplomatic Corps and Lebanese Ministers. Before being appointed to a diplomatic post he made a name for himself in Prague in the catering trade. He is said to be overbearing towards, and unpopular with, his staff.

**Egypt**

General Abdel Hamid Ghaleb, Minister (October 26, 1954).

General Ghaleb, who is in his middle forties, is married and has two sons, in their teens. As a cadet he was at the Royal Military College, Woolwich. I first met him in Egypt before the war when he was attached to the British Military Mission and I always found him friendly and communicative. He was Military Attaché both in London (1945 to 1948) and afterwards in Washington. General Ghaleb makes no secret of his friendly connexions with the British in the past. Events following the Turco-Iraqi Pact have not diminished his personal friendliness. He is an M.B.E.

**France**

M. Georges Balay, Ambassador (Minister, April 7, 1952; Ambassador, October 1952).

\*A well-groomed, almost dapper little man, unmarried. Can speak English and knows from personal acquaintance something of places and people in the United Kingdom. Is friendly, reasonable and glad to co-operate. More detached in his attitude than most Frenchmen in this country and knows his diplomatic trade well but does not get on very well with the Lebanese, perhaps because of his slightly superior air towards them and gift for implying in conversation that a plebiscite would restore the Mandate. (Written in 1952.)

**German Federal Republic**

Dr. Herbert Noehring, Minister (May 20, 1953).

\*A rather distinguished-looking man, apparently unmarried, in the early fifties. Sword-scarred cheek and an eye and look whose inborn hardness an instinct for the main chance and the veneer of professional diplomacy do not completely mask. Anxious to be friendly to us and bitterly recriminative against Ribbentrop. Speaks English fluently from several years in America. Also served in pre-war Bagdad. (Written in 1953.)

**Greece**

M. Georges St. Seferiades, Minister (January 1, 1953).

Also accredited to Bagdad, Damascus and Amman.

\*A charming, elderly man, married. A post-war diplomatist, he came here from London and seems genuinely pro-British. Speaks sufficient English. Said to be the leading poet of modern Greece. Was chief of Greek Information Services abroad during the war and later private secretary to Archbishop Damaskinos when Regent. (Written in 1953.)

**Holy See**

Mgr. Giuseppe Beltrami, Nuncio (December 2, 1950).

\*A dignified ecclesiastic of the old school with polished, if a trifle fussy, manners. Anxious to be friendly and having, from his own account, narrowly escaped being lynched during anti-clerical riots in South America, is very sensitive to "confessional" differences among the Lebanese and, like all Catholics, including Maronites in this country, fearful of the further growth of the Moslem element in the population. (Written in 1952.)

**Iraq**

Mohamed Salim Al-Radi, Ambassador (September 20, 1954).

In the late forties, formerly a Civil Servant but has served in Iraqi Missions in the United States and India. Speaks English well and is friendly, generally speaking. Not very bright. Has a charming well-bred wife who has some Kurdish blood in her. Three or four children.

**Italy**

Signor Pio Antonio Archi, Minister (November 6, 1953).

\*A good professional diplomatist of the "official" type, in the late forties. Was previously head of the Personnel Department in Rome and before that Counsellor in Cairo. Co-operative where our interests coincide. His wife, a Florentine, friendly but a heavy, peasantry sort of person. (Written in 1954.)

**Jordan**

M. Jamal Toukun, Ambassador (October 25, 1954).

(Originally presented credentials as Minister to Lebanon on October 12, 1950.)

A Palestinian, previously mutessarrif of Jerusalem and a senior official in the former British Palestine administration. Speaks excellent English and a most affable and friendly colleague. He seeks our co-operation in all matters where we have common interests. His wife is shy, gentle and in ill-health and only attends receptions when she has to. Favours Hashemite unity and inclined to blame Britain for not encompassing it. (Written in 1952.) Was for some months in 1954 Foreign Minister of Jordan, but returned to Beirut as soon as he could, largely for health reasons.

**Liberia**

M. Henry Gemayel, Chargé d'Affaires (February 10, 1951).

\*Is a Lebanese permanently resident in the Lebanon and thus holds a sort of local honorary appointment which the Diplomatic Corps recognise only on sufferance. (Written in 1953.)

**Mexico**

Sr. Marco A. Almazán, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (September 1953).

Intelligent, friendly and quite well-informed. A good type of Latin American diplomat, with an attractive wife. Both speak excellent English.

**Netherlands**

M. Henk Goemans, Chargé d'Affaires (June 7, 1952).

A career Foreign Service officer whose service has been mostly consular. A widower of just over fifty and to be trusted as a friend of Britain. Speaks English, French and Russian fluently; was previously in Cairo.

**Persia**

M. R. Atabaki, Minister (September 3, 1954).

Was Consul-General here some ten years ago before filling diplomatic appointments in Europe. Speaks French. Professes himself a sincere friend of Britain. His wife is related to General Zahedi. Several children.

**Poland**

M. Zigmunt Zawadowski, Minister (August 17, 1944).

\*Until the enforced dissolution in July 1945 of the Government which he claims to represent, M. Zawadowski enjoyed a good position here. Since then he has maintained a brave front in the face of an increasingly difficult position due mostly to lack of funds, not to mention the embarrassing presence of Soviet and satellite colleagues in the Diplomatic Corps. Is particularly well informed about the political situation here and about the private lives of Communist representatives both here and in neighbouring countries. Always ready to put his knowledge and information at our disposal, and generous in his expressions of gratitude for British help to former members of the Polish Brigade who for one reason or another, mostly illness, remain in this country. Visits London regularly once a year. Has a wife who lives mostly in Paris, and a daughter who sometimes comes to stay here. (Written in 1952.)

**Saudi Arabia**

Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ben Zeid, Minister (February 16, 1945). Lives in Damascus.

M. Saïd el-Rachache, Chargé d'Affaires (December 11, 1946).

\*A Damascene by birth, son of a wealthy, cultured father who had a noteworthy collection of Chinese porcelain. He speaks French and English. Not a strict Moslem, but formal and correct in public. He married, when she was thirteen, a lady of Turkish origin. They have four children, the eldest now nearly thirty. Definitely friendly towards Britain. (Written in 1954.)

**Soviet Union**

M. Vassili A. Beliaev, Minister (March 15, 1951).

\*Young in appearance, an engineer originally, but stiff and formal, rarely smiling, with a young and well-dressed wife and three children. Speaks French, wife taking English lessons. Always prepared to engage in conversation if approached, but is usually disinclined to take the first step. Visited London during the war and (he says) stayed at Chequers. Appeared very shaken by the death of Stalin but seemed, on the slight relaxation of official rigidity that followed, to relish the opportunity of more free and easy contacts. (Written in 1953.) \*After six months' home leave during 1953-54, he returned, leaving his wife and children in Russia. (Written in 1954.)

**Spain**

Sr. Don Juan Felipe de Ranero y Rodriguez, Ambassador (Minister, June 26, 1953; Ambassador, September 21, 1953).

\*A rubicund little man, said to be wealthy, with a Vicar of Brayish career, but who, to me in private, expressed passionately Royalist sentiments. Shrewd, yet talkative to the point of indiscretion. (Written in 1953.) Wife undistinguished, but speaks English.

**Switzerland**

Dr. Franz Kappeler, Minister (December 28, 1950). Also accredited to Syria.

\*Spent some years as Counsellor in Berlin during the war. A quiet, but charming person, he and his wife are always friendly. Four children. A typical Swiss family. (Written in 1953.)

**Turkey**

M. Cevdet Dülger, Minister (December 15, 1954).

Speaks quite good French. Started his career nearly twenty years ago in London and afterwards went to Cairo. Is friendly and forthcoming. His former wife is now married to Aly Yehia, the well-known cotton broker of Alexandria. M. Dülger, who has custody of the child, a daughter, has not remarried. Somewhat tactless in his diplomacy and inclined to press in and out of season.

**United States**

Mr. Donald R. Heath, Ambassador (March 9, 1955).

Came to Beirut from Saigon accompanied by his wife but not his children, who are, I believe, grown up. I have been favourably impressed during our exchange of courtesy calls and do not expect to have any difficulty in co-operating with him. He seems to be frank, straight-forward and friendly towards Britain.

**Uruguay**

Sr. José Aiub Menzor, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (September 9, 1951).

\*As his name implies, comes of an emigrant family of Syrian origin. He is friendly, but our paths seldom cross. (Written in 1954.)

**Venezuela**

Sr. Arturo Lares, Minister (February 3, 1954).

\*An undistinguished friendly person of about sixty. His first diplomatic post. A journalist by profession, was exiled as a young man for implication in a revolt, and thereafter lived for many years

in the United States, where he started a Spanish language newspaper. Is also accredited to Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. (Written in 1954.)

**Yugoslavia**

M. Milos Lalovic, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (February 26, 1954).

A friendly but rather inconspicuous person. Not well-informed—partly, no doubt, because he is a bad linguist. His (second) wife is shy and shows signs of having recently left Yugoslavia by having to refer all her opinions for confirmation to her husband. Both are very well-disposed to the British.

---

**Ministers Accredited to the Lebanon but Resident Elsewhere**

**Afghanistan**

Abdul Samed Khan (August 13, 1953). Bagdad.

**Cuba**

Sr. Luis P. de Almagro y Elizaga (January 24, 1953). Cairo.

**Denmark**

M. George Host (October 6, 1953). Cairo.

**Finland**

M. Bruno Kivikoske (October 1, 1954). Ankara.

**India**

Nawab Ali Yavar Jung Bahadur (August 16, 1954). Cairo.

**Netherlands**

M. Willen Cnoop Koopmans (December 3, 1951).

**Norway**

M. Christian Prahls Reusch. Cairo.

**Pakistan**

S. Lalshah Bokhari (November 12, 1954). Damascus.

**Peru**

M. Julio Fernandez Davila, Minister (October 26, 1954). Cairo.

**Sweden**

Count Gustaf Weidel (March 27, 1952). Cairo. Under orders of transfer.



## APPENDIX

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

VL 1012/1

No. 12

## LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE LEBANON

*Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Mr. Macmillan. (Received June 2)*

(No. 63. Confidential)

Beirut,

Sir,

May 26, 1955.

I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on leading personalities in the Lebanon.

I have, &amp;c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

Enclosure

## Index of Leading Personalities in the Lebanon

- |                                |                               |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Ibrahim Abdel Aal.          | 43. Moussa de Freige.         |
| 2. Habib Abi-Chahla.           | 44. Maurice Gemayel.          |
| 3. Halim Abou-Izzeddin.        | 45. Pierre Gemayel.           |
| 4. Joseph Abou-Khater.         | 46. Colonel Jean Aziz Ghazi.  |
| 5. Ibrahim Ahdab.              | 47. Ibrahim Haider.           |
| 6. Nazim Akkari.               | 48. Selim Haider.             |
| 7. Naim Amoun.                 | 49. Georges Haimari.          |
| 8. Fouad Amoun.                | 50. Abdallah Hajj.            |
| 9. Hussein Aouein.             | 51. Georges Hakim.            |
| 10. George Arida.              | 52. Sabri Hamade.             |
| 11. Mustapha el-Ariss.         | 53. Said Hamade.              |
| 12. Fernand Arsantos.          | 54. Joseph Hariouche.         |
| 13. Emir Megid Arslan.         | 55. Chahk Hatem.              |
| 14. Ahmed el-Assad.            | 56. Charles Helou.            |
| 15. Georges Assi.              | 57. Khalil Hibri.             |
| 16. Gabriel Assouad.           | 58. Joseph Hiti.              |
| 17. Raif Bellama.              | 59. Joseph Hrawi.             |
| 18. Rashid Beydoun.            | 60. Sayed Ahmed el-Husseini.  |
| 19. Amin Beyhum.               | 61. Kemal Joubblatt.          |
| 20. Mohammed Ali Beyhum.       | 62. Mlle. Ibtihaj Kaddoura.   |
| 21. Jawad Boulos.              | 63. Georges Karam.            |
| 22. Philippe Boulos.           | 64. Joseph Karam.             |
| 23. Emile Boustani.            | 65. Rifaa Kazoun.             |
| 24. Nicolas Bustros.           | 66. Raschid Kerame.           |
| 25. Fouad Chader.              | 67. Charles Kettaneh.         |
| 26. Camille Joseph Chamoun.    | 68. Joseph Khadige.           |
| 27. Camille Nimr Chamoun.      | 69. Anoir Khaïb.              |
| 28. Joseph Nimr Chamoun.       | 70. Izzet Khourchid.          |
| 29. R. P. Charles de Chamussy. | 71. Sheikh Béchara el-Khoury. |
| 30. Joseph Charbel.            | 72. Elias Khoury.             |
| 31. Emir Farid Chehab.         | 73. Emile Khoury.             |
| 32. General Fouad Chehab.      | 74. Sheikh Fouad el-Khoury.   |
| 33. Emir Jamil Chehab.         | 75. Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury.  |
| 34. Emir Khaled Chehab.        | 76. Sheikh Sami el-Khoury.    |
| 35. Georges Choueiri.          | 77. Sheikh Selim el-Khoury.   |
| 36. Ahmed Daouk.               | 78. Victor Khoury.            |
| 37. Nadim Demechkié.           | 79. Salah Lababidi.           |
| 38. Baron Maxime de Dumast.    | 80. Selim Lahoud.             |
| 39. Pierre Eddé.               | 81. Subhi Mahmassani.         |
| 40. Raymond Eddé.              | 82. Charles Malik.            |
| 41. Jean Fattal.               | 83. Nasri Malouf.             |
| 42. Hamid Frangié.             | 84. Abdallah Mashnouq.        |
|                                | 85. Badri Meoushi.            |
|                                | 86. Jamil Mikaoui.            |
|                                | 87. Moussa Mobarak.           |
|                                | 88. Moukhtar Moukaiech.       |
|                                | 89. Saadi Mounla.             |
|                                | 90. Kamel Mroueh.             |
|                                | 91. Gabriel Murr.             |
|                                | 92. Alfred Naccache.          |
|                                | 93. Georges Naccache.         |
|                                | 94. Adib Nahas.               |
|                                | 95. General Souleiman Naufal. |
|                                | 96. Muhieddin Nsouli.         |
|                                | 97. Mustapha Nsouli.          |
|                                | 98. Adel Osseiran.            |
|                                | 99. Henri Pharaon.            |
|                                | 100. General Nouredine Rifai. |
|                                | 101. Mme. Hélène Rihan.       |
|                                | 102. Abdel Rahman Sahmarani.  |
|                                | 103. Mohammed Salam.          |
|                                | 104. Saeb Salam.              |

105. Amis Saleh.
106. Joseph Salem.
107. Colonel Toufiq Salem.
108. Joseph Saouda.
109. Fouad Sarrouf.
110. Mohammed Shoucair.
111. Sami Shoucair.
112. Abdel Karim Sibahi.
113. Alfred Skaf.
114. Jean Skaf.
115. Kazem Solh.
116. Sami Solh.
117. Takiieddin Solh.
118. Georges Tabet.
119. Jacques Tabet.
120. Mme. Laure Tabet.
121. Maurice Tabet.
122. Bahige Takiieddin.
123. Khalil Takiieddin.
124. Philippe Takla.
125. Colonel Fauzi Traboulsi.
126. Gabriel Trad.
127. André Tueni.
128. Ghassan Tueni.
129. Charles Tyan.
130. Abdallah Yail.
131. Simon Zouein.
132. Constantin Zuraik.

#### 1. Ibrahim Abdel Aal

Born 1917, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and French School of Engineering, Beirut. Family of Egyptian origin. Engineer by training; civil servant by adoption. Formerly Director-General of Public Works; now Director-General of Concessionary Companies. Intelligent, hard-working and, as far as is known, honest, but without many social graces.

#### 2. Habib Abi-Chahla

Born about 1900, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated American University, Beirut; Lawyer. Formerly supported President Emile Eddé but broke with him in 1943. In November 1943 remained loyal to Sheikh Béchara el-Khoury in his conflict with the French, and headed resistance group in the mountains for the eleven days during which President el-Khoury and his Government were interned; during this period he acted as Head of State. President of the Chamber, 1946-47. Deputy since 1943. Several times a Minister. Now legal adviser to the Tapline Company and very influential in both political and commercial circles, in particular he has many American contacts and is much involved in the political ramifications of the oil business. A notorious womaniser, of which he boasts openly, he holds the Order of Purity and Chastity awarded by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch. Had a severe heart attack in February 1954 from which he has now completely recovered and is once more accepting public duties.

#### 3. Halim Abou-Izzeddin

Born 1913, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated at American University, Beirut. Bachelor, Lebanese Foreign Service; after serving in Cairo transferred to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950; he became head of the Political Section in 1951 and Chief of Protocol in 1953. Acting Director-General, Ministry of Information, March 1954-March 1955. In April 1955 transferred back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Head of Protocol. Honest, intelligent and has political ambitions. Visited United Kingdom at invitation of Her Majesty's Government August 1954. A Lebanese delegate to Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, April 1955. Co-operative with this embassy. Speaks good English.

#### 4. Joseph Abou-Khater

Born Zahlé about 1905; Greek Catholic; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and studied law in France. Married. Lawyer. A leader of the anti-Skaf faction in Zahlé. Formerly Lebanese Minister in Mexico; appointed Minister at Rome, 1953. Clever and politically ambitious.

#### 5. Ibrahim Ahdab

Born Beirut 1902; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Former contractor and engineer, Lebanese Minister at Ankara since 1947. Honest and intelligent but indecisive. Transferred to Berne in February 1954. Sent to Ankara in February 1955 as Special Envoy mainly to prepare Lebanese President's visit to Turkey and to study on the spot development of situation arising out of Turco-Iraqi Pact.

#### 6. Nazim Akkari

Born 1898, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. The best Civil Servant in the Lebanon. Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office since 1945. Temporarily Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 1952. Honest, shrewd and experienced. A most useful and helpful source of advice and information.

#### 7. Naim Amiouni

Born 1916. Worked for some seven years with Iraq Petroleum Company, from which he gained respect for British administrative methods. A career diplomat, has served in Russia and Brazil. Since 1953 has been Assistant Director of Economic Section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Excellent linguist. Able and ambitious he is co-operative with this Embassy although his political ideas are Leftish. Wife is intelligent and attractive.

#### 8. Fouad Ammoun

Born 1899, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Former judge. Now Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with rank of ambassador. Well educated with a broad mind and good grasp of his profession. Friendly and helpful to this embassy within his powers but not a strong character, and without much apparent influence on policy.

#### 9. Hussein Aouein

Born 1902, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Greek Catholic College, Beirut. Married. Of humble origins but while still young made a large fortune in Saudi Arabia, where he still has many contacts. He has many other business interests, including, it is said, smuggling. Formerly Deputy, 1947-51. In 1951 formed caretaker Cabinet to supervise elections which he did successfully and honestly. Still regarded as a possible "non-political" Prime Minister but somewhat discredited for his financial connexions with the family of President el-Khoury. Clever but an unprincipled opportunist. Took a leading part in combating Turco-Iraqi Pact and to this end joined hands with Kemal Joubblatt and the Communists.

#### 10. George Arida

Born about 1898, in Australia; Maronite; educated abroad, mainly in Australia, Canada and Mexico. Married. Formerly Honorary British Vice-Consul at Tripoli, having returned to his family home there and opened a textile factory which earned him great wealth during the Second World War. His wife has social ambitions (e.g., his daughter is married to Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury (No. 75) and they are anxious to cut a dash (e.g., their purchase after the war of Hitler's yacht which they sold at a heavy loss). But he himself is a mild and amiable character with little personality.

#### 11. Mustapha el-Ariss

Born 1912, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; primary education only. Married. Trade union leader and agitator. Started life as printer, at one time chairman of Printers' Union. Left Lebanon in March 1953 for medical treatment in Moscow and other Iron-Curtain countries and has not yet returned (April 1955). Very militant Communist; imprisoned several times.

#### 12. Fernand Arsanios

Born 1898, Batroun; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Judge. *Persona non grata* under President el-Khoury. Appointed Procureur Général of the Supreme Court in February 1953; well known for his honesty and political independence.

#### 13. Emir Megid Arslan

Born about 1908, Choueifat; Druze; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Widower. Anti-German during the war; helped resist Vichy France. Several times Minister since 1943 as Druze representative, loyal to President el-Khoury; bitter opponent of Kemal Joubblatt. A cheerful, uneducated and highly venal feudal chieftain with a boyish passion for dressing-up and firearms. In the habit of smuggling cattle into Israel. Again Minister in the second Yafi Cabinet under the Chamoun régime. Accompanied President on his visit to South America in May 1954. Once again Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Sami Solh in September 1954.

#### 14. Ahmed el-Assad

Born 1905, Taibé, South Lebanon; Shia Moslem; primary education only. Married to the clever daughter (who never appears in public) of his uncle, from whom he has inherited the feudal paramourcy in South Lebanon. Several times Minister since 1941; President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1951 until October 1953. Although he puts on a pro-British façade and speaks some English, he is an unprincipled rogue with only crafty cunning, who has done very well out of the balance of power in the Lebanon and is opposed to any real reform. Despite his official position, he undermines authority by all lucrative means, including the sale of parliamentary seats and smuggling on the Israel border.

#### 15. Georges Assi

Born 1908, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. A municipal official until January 1953 when he was appointed Mohafez of Beirut. Married to a sister of Habib Abi-Chahla (No. 2). Quite presentable. Honest and energetic but not very intelligent.

#### 16. Gabriel Assouad

Born 1896, Beirut; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. A Civil Servant; appointed Director-General of the Interior in January 1953. Honest but weak; lacks initiative and personality. Unintelligent and servile to the powers that be; was retired by Government in April 1955 because of age-limit.

#### 17. Raif Bellanu

Born 1897, Beirut; Maronite; educated American University, Beirut. Married. Lecturer in bacteriology at American University, Beirut. Minister of Education, 1949. Appointed Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League in 1953. Witty and a good speaker but a political light-weight.

#### 18. Rashid Beydoun

Born about 1897, Beirut; Shia Moslem; primary education. Married. Deputy since 1943. Twice

Cabinet Minister. A genial Moslem back politician of no great significance. Has founded, partly with his own money, a large Shia Moslem college in Beirut.

#### 19. Amin Beyhum

Born 1907, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Elected Deputy 1951 but has since greatly disappointed his electors and has never spoken in the Chamber. Did not stand for the 1953 legislative elections.

#### 20. Mohammed Ali Beyhum

Born 1889, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. A prominent Moslem whose valour is liable to outrun his discretion.

#### 21. Jawad Boulos

Born 1900, Tripoli; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Deputy and Minister for Foreign Affairs under French Mandate. Now an unsuccessful and disgruntled ex-politician posing as an elder statesman, ready to resume office *pour sauver la patrie*. Engaged in writing an interminable History of the Near East (he has now reached about 3,000 n.c.) about which, as most other things, he is a crashing bore.

#### 22. Philippe Boulos

Born 1902, North Lebanon; Greek Orthodox. Married. Lawyer and politician. Several times Minister since 1941. A safe figure for a Greek Orthodox vacancy in any Government; in the intervals resumes his place as a judge. Vice-President of the Chamber since 1952. Failed in legislative elections of 1953. Colourless with an affable veneer.

#### 23. Emile Boustani

Born 1907, Sidon; Maronite (with Protestant intervals when it suits him); educated American University of Beirut and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Married to a pleasant redhead. A self-made contractor of great wealth. Head of the C.A.T. (Contracting and Trading) Company with ramifications in the Arab countries and Persian Gulf. Rootes's agent at Beirut. Deputy since 1951. Strong Pan-Arabist posing as a "candid friend" of Britain with the accent on "candid." Anxious to be President of the Republic, he makes his commercial interests serve his political ambitions and *vice versa*. His main line is to gain popularity and notoriety by consistent opposition to the powers that be. The *enfant terrible* of Lebanese politics, he should not be trusted out of eyesight or earshot but his skin is so thick that he is quite an engaging rogue. Speaks excellent English.

#### 24. Nicolas Bustros

Born 1896, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite of a rather effeminate type. Entered official life as Chief of Protocol to the President of the Republic, 1937. Resigned 1938. Re-appointed 1943; later transferred in same capacity to Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1949. Holds rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Active in intrigues leading to fall of President el-Khoury in September 1952. A quarrelsome chatterbox but intelligent and well informed, with pleasant social manners.

#### 25. Fouad Chader

Born 1910. Has spent the greater part of his career in the Customs, where he established a reputation for honesty and good administration. Has been Director of Civil Aviation since 1953. Is friendly and intelligent.

**26. Camille Joseph Chamoun**

Born 1903, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse, Beirut. Bachelor. Journalist and former president of the Lebanese Press Syndicate. An amiable and comparatively honest individual who is well informed and whose rather foxy and shifty appearance is probably misleading.

**27. Camille Nimr Chamoun**

Born 1901, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married to the former Zelfa Tabet, an attractive woman of mixed Irish and Lebanese extraction; his sons have been educated in England. President of the Republic since September 1952; formerly lawyer and politician. Minister of the Interior, September 1943; arrested by the French November 1943, since when strongly prejudiced against France. Lebanese Minister in London 1944-47. Minister of Finance 1947 and of the Interior 1947 to May 1948. The most consistent leader of the Opposition to President el-Khoury from 1948 to September 1952, when he was himself elected President, defeating Hamid Frangie. Although honest and with genuine reformist sympathies, he has proved too weak so far to pursue a consistent policy as President. Of attractive presence, he has relied too much on his personal popularity and has been a disappointment to the Opposition and the despair of the old political bosses whom he refuses to consult. Despite his British connexions and superficial Anglicisms, his foreign policy has been largely dominated by Arab sentiments, although he would undoubtedly support the West in any conflict with communism. His attractive personality makes excellent first impressions, especially on women, but his intellectual woolliness tends to become exasperating. Speaks excellent English.

**28. Joseph Nimr Chamoun**

Born 1896, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères and American University of Beirut. Married. Brother of President Camille Chamoun. Director-General of Public Works 1944-48. Director-General of Inspection Department since June 1952, for which rôle he is utterly unsuited. An industrious subordinate. While carrying on with his job at the Inspection Department was also appointed acting Chief of the Telephone Department in 1954.

**29. R. P. Charles de Chamussy**

Born about 1903; Père Recteur (Head) of St. Joseph's University (Jesuits). While a convinced French Jesuit, he has charming manners and is always friendly to this embassy.

**30. Joseph Charbel**

Born 1896, Zahlé; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse. Bachelor. Procureur Général 1943-52. Now President of the Conseil d'Etat. Victim of an aggression by a member of the P.P.S., as a result of which he lay in hospital for several months. Honest and well educated but without much moral courage.

**31. Emir Fawid Chehab**

Born 1909; Maronite; educated privately. Married. Head of Counter Espionage Department under the French Mandate. Imprisoned by Free French for contacts with Vichy 1942-43. Re-entered Police Department 1943 and became Director of Sécurité Générale 1948. A good linguist who gets on well with the British, but is not as deeply imbued with a sense of civic duty as he would have them believe. Extravagant and somewhat of a playboy but honest and conscientious.

**32. General Fouad Chehab**

Born 1901, Beirut; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères Maristes, Jounieh. Married to a French wife. Trained in the French army and Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. Gained great prestige for keeping the peace during "revolution" of September 1952, when he was temporarily Prime Minister. Honest and loyal and determined to preserve the political independence of the army. His personal charm is greater than his intelligence and he is the exasperation of his more politically-minded subordinates.

**33. Emir Jamil Chehab**

Born 1898, Beirut; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères Maristes, Jounieh. Married. Civil Servant who served in Finance and Customs departments with distinction. Now head of Cour des Comptes (Audit Department). Although hard-working and conscientious, his obstinacy and narrow-mindedness have brought him into trouble with his superiors. But his independent judgment is valued by the L.P.C.

**34. Emir Khaled Chehab**

Born 1891, Hasbaya; Sunni Moslem; primary education. Married. Formerly Prime Minister and President of the Chamber under the French Mandate. Lebanese Minister at Amman 1948-52 when he was recalled by President Chamoun to become Prime Minister. Resumed his duties at Amman, with the rank of Ambassador in 1953. Honest and possessed of a certain peasant shrewdness, but his weakness and a certain appearance of imbecility were not calculated to inculcate respect for his Government. He is, however, well meaning and friendly.

**35. Georges Choucri**

Born 1909, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Jesuit University of Beirut. Merchant. Appointed municipal councillor in 1951 but soon resigned "finding the whole thing too dirty to work in." Again appointed municipal councillor in February 1953 and elected Vice-President of Beirut Municipality, but resigned in 1954 and was immediately afterwards appointed vice-chairman of the Electricity Company's Board. Very honest and straightforward. As secretary for some years of the Association of Businessmen he is the most important member of this influential organisation.

**36. Ahmed Daouk**

Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Prime Minister 1941-42 but lost influence through weakness and incompetence. Appointed Lebanese Minister in Paris 1944 and promoted Ambassador in 1953. Often spoken of as a possible "neutral" Prime Minister.

**37. Nadim Demochkie**

Born 1915, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married to an English wife. Lebanese Foreign Service. Served London, Ottawa, and Cairo where he has been Lebanese Chargé d'Affaires since 1953. An able and likeable young man, he is inclined to advocate Arab nationalist views and wishes to enter political life. Speaks good English.

**38. Baron Maxime de Dumast**

Born about 1890. Formerly a general in the French air force and "chef de Cabinet" to the French Air Minister. Since 1946 managing director of the French concessionary Port Company of Beirut. A busy little man with pleasant manners who runs a good show and does much for its public relations.

**39. Pierre Eddé**

Born 1920, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Son of late President Emile Eddé; married 1950 a rich Lebanese of Brazil. Politician and champion of Christian rights in the Lebanon. Although active in politics ever since his childhood, his first entry into public life was his election as Deputy of Mount Lebanon in 1951. Minister of Finance under A. Yafi from August 1953 to March 1954. Shrewd and intriguer.

**40. Raymond Eddé**

Born 1918, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Lawyer. Elder son of President Emile Eddé from whom he inherited leadership of the Francophile "Bloc National." Elected Deputy in July 1953. Honest and likeable.

**41. Jean Fattal**

Born 1903, Damascus; Syrian Catholic; educated in Austria. Married. Merchant and part owner of a firm of commission agents in Damascus and Beirut. Personally honest but a shrewd money-maker with his ear close to the political ground.

**42. Hamid Frangie**

Born 1905, Zghorta; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli, and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician and Deputy. Since 1941 several times Minister, usually of Foreign Affairs. One of the main leaders of the Christian faction in North Lebanon. Although at first a sturdy champion of an independent Lebanon, he steadily repaired his fences with the French and was backed by them to succeed President el-Khoury in 1952, after he had tentatively come out in support of the Opposition. His disappointment at not being elected led to a partial estrangement with President Chamoun and his interest turned largely to building up his fortunes as a corporation lawyer, but he is still quite young and intelligent, with a wide knowledge of Western European culture and he cannot fail to return as a political force in the future. Although a true Lebanese he is more able than most to look at events through international spectacles. Has recently been the target of very strong attacks by his political opponents of North Lebanon. His relations with the Palace have improved considerably of late.

**43. Moussa de Freige**

Born 1910, Beirut; Roman Catholic; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Has the hereditary papal title of Marquis which he likes to use. A wealthy socialite and race-horse owner, connected with the family of President el-Khoury and unpopular among Moslems. Had assumed responsibility for direction of *Le Jour* even before the death of his uncle, Michel Chiha, in December 1954. Speaks English.

**44. Maurice Gemayel**

Born 1910, Bikfaya; Maronite; educated Jesuit University and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. Lawyer. Leading Phalangist; cousin and brother-in-law of Pierre Gemayel (No. 46). Seeks to promote irrigation and electrical schemes. Relatively honest and intelligent.

**45. Pierre Gemayel**

Born about 1909, Bikfaya; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Leader of the Phalange Movement which affects extreme Christian and Lebanese nationalist in opposition to Moslem Pan-Arab ideas. Although one of the most vigorous, reformist politicians outside the Chamber, he is probably more noisy than influential. A director of *Amal*.

**46. Colonel Jean Aziz Ghazi**

Born 1900, Beirut; Maronite; educated Egypt and French Army Schools. Married to a French wife. Although next in seniority to General Chehab in Lebanese army has little say in its affairs. A pleasant and vigorous personality, but discipline seems to irk him and he is inclined to rather loose anti-Western talk, which may reflect political ambitions and restlessness in his present job. Speaks English. In January 1954 was accused of preparing a military *coup* directed against his Commander-in-Chief and, as a result of this, was put on pension without being court-martialled.

**47. Ibrahim Haidar**

Born 1888, Bekaa; Shia Moslem; educated locally and in France. Married. Several times Deputy and Minister, but failed in 1953 legislative elections. A tiny little man whose bumptiousness and seniority in the Chamber gives his remarks more weight than they deserve. A crafty and dishonest political intriguer who lost his last ministerial post for complicity in hashish smuggling.

**48. Selim Haidar**

Born 1912, Baalbek; Shia Moslem. Doctor of law, Paris. Judge and poet turned politician, with an attractive and lively wife. Lebanese Minister in Tehran from 1948 till October 1952, when he became Cabinet Minister. Elected Deputy in 1953. An amiable and gentle but colourless figure with intellectual leanings. Minister of Agriculture and Post and Telegraphs in the Sanai Solh Cabinet of September 1954.

**49. Georges Haimari**

Born 1898, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. "Chef de Cabinet" to the President of the Republic 1920-43 and from 1945. O.B.E. 1947. Chairman of Lebanese Government Commission on Palestine Refugees since 1948. Honest until a few years ago when he began to feather his own and his family's nest. Much under the influence of his father confessors but very friendly and helpful to the British. He is rather an old woman and his relations with President Chamoun, though strained at first, are now steadily improving.

**50. Abdallah Hajj**

Born 1898, Ghobairi (near Beirut); Shia Moslem, educated American University of Beirut. Married. School-teacher in Bagdad, then a politician. Elected Deputy in 1951 in the Opposition list where he still belongs and re-elected in 1953. Dishonest but dynamic. A rather unsavoury character with a nuisance value in politics.

**51. Georges Hakim**

Born 1914, Tripoli, Greek Orthodox; educated at American University of Beirut. Married to an American wife. Professor and politician; after teaching economics at the American University of Beirut joined Lebanese Foreign Service and served at Lebanese Legation at Washington and the permanent Lebanese delegation at the United Nations. Appointed Minister of Finance and National Economy October 1952; also Foreign Minister in February 1953. Honest and very intelligent, but stubborn and inclined to take an academic approach. Holds Left-wing economic views which he applies skilfully and with more political sense than appears at first sight. During the year 1954 underwent several surgical operations both in the Lebanon and in the United States. Has now recovered and although still weak has now resumed work as assistant Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**52. Sabri Hamadé**

Born about 1903, Bekaa; Shia Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married to daughter of Ahmed al-Assad (No. 14). Deputy and former Minister. President of the Chamber of Deputies 1943-46 and 1948-51. A crude and venal politician whose local influence in the Bekaa gives him a nuisance value. A notorious hashish smuggler and one of the principal targets of the reformers.

**53. Saïd Hamadé**

Born about 1895, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated American University of Beirut. Widower. Professor of applied economics, American University of Beirut. The Laski of the Lebanon (in moderation). Inspires the generally left-wing economic views of such people as Georges Hakim and Kemal Joumlatt. But a very gentle revolutionary with much charm and a good command of English.

**54. Joseph Harfouche**

Born 1918, Beirut Maronite. Unmarried. Educated Jesuit University. Served in French Consulate-General in Cairo until 1945, when he was attached to Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Has served as Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels and as Minister to the Holy See. Appointed head of the Political Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1953. Strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western in political outlook. Anxious to promote closer relations between Lebanon and the Western Powers. Intelligent, friendly but slightly superficial.

**55. Chafik Hatem**

Born 1910, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. Judge. Senior and leading official of the Ministry of Justice until February, 1953, when he became acting Director-General of that Ministry. An efficient subordinate who knows how to make himself useful, especially to President Chamoun, as a draftsman and expert on legal matters. Although fairly honest, he is a time-server and intriguer.

**56. Charles Helou**

Born 1912, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. Closely associated on *Le Jour* with Michel Chiha who is also his political patron. Lebanese Minister to the Holy See 1947-49; Minister for Foreign Affairs 1951-52. Minister of Justice in the Government of Sami Solh of September 1954. An intelligent and patriotic Lebanese of the Christian persuasion with a close eye on his own advancement.

**57. Khalil Hibri**

Born 1907, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Wealthy businessman (cars and real estate). Arab nationalist but makes no secret of his belief in co-operation with the British. Spends lavishly to ensure his popularity among lower class Moslems of Beirut. Influential in Moslem organisations. Opposed A. Yafi in the 1953 elections but failed. Honest, loyal and generous.

**58. Joseph Hitti**

Born 1896, Shemlan; Maronite; educated American University of Beirut, followed by medical studies in the United States of America and Canada. Married. Brother of Professor Philippe Hitti, the Arab historian, of Princeton University, United States of America. Elected Deputy in 1947; stood again in 1951 but failed. Honest and a good physician without much personality or presence. His judgment in political matters is somewhat distorted by personal disappointments. But he makes himself useful as a political go-between and "fixer."

**59. Joseph Hrawi**

Born 1895, Zahle; Maronite; primary education only. Married. Ex-Deputy; formerly Minister of Agriculture and Posts and Telegraphs. Sympathises with the Communists but claims that it is only for electoral purposes. A born subordinate.

**60. Sayed Ahmed el-Husseini**

Born 1888, Bekaa; Shia Moslem; primary education. Married. Ex-Deputy and former Minister. He speaks neither English nor French and cuts very little ice, although nobody seems to know very much against him.

**61. Kemal Joumlatt**

Born 1914, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married to a lively and intelligent member of the Arslan clan. Deputy since 1943 and feudal leader of the Druze faction opposed to the Arslans. He is also leader of the Socialist and Progressive Party and the principal exponent of ideological socialism in the Lebanon, which he expounds on the platform and through his newspaper *Al Anba*. His party symbol is the crossed pick-axe and pencil. His reformist views and his personal attacks were a main motive force leading to President el-Khoury's fall in September 1952. But he has since not concealed his disappointment with the slow progress of reform under President Chamoun. He is working hard to increase his following in the Chamber after new elections but it is hard to know how much of his influence is ideological and how much depends on his position as a Druze chieftain. He is closely interested in Asiatic currents of thought, particularly in Indian mysticism but at the same time he is quite a shrewd, practical politician whose social and economic theories, if extreme, are consistent and well argued. Although opposed to communism he is inclined to neglect the dangers of his Left-wing neutralism. While of un-couth appearance and a fiery demagogue in public, he has gentle and unassuming manners in private conversation. His devotion to his cause and his mystical practices are probably ruining his health, but while he lasts he is likely to remain one of the most interesting figures in the Lebanon.

**62. Mlle. Ibtihaj Kaddoura**

Born 1898, Beirut; Sunni Moslem. Leading member of various feminist organisations. Appointed municipal councillor February 1953. Honest and well meaning.

**63. Georges Karam**

Born 1897, Beirut; Maronite; educated Antoura College (Lazarists). Married. Rich timber merchant and large share-holder in Air Liban. Elected Deputy 1951 but failed in the 1953 elections. The fact that he was once imprisoned for a false Customs declaration has been conveniently forgotten. Neither honest nor intelligent but shrewd at making money. Vain and mean but quite presentable socially.

**64. Joseph Karam**

Born 1899, Zghorta; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli. Married. The principal contender with Hamid Frangié for leadership of the Christians in North Lebanon. Deputy since 1944 but failed in the 1953 elections. Rather weak character.

**65. Rifaaat Kazoun**

Born about 1908, Bekaa; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycée Français. Married. Ex-Deputy since 1943. Venal and a known arms smuggler, he is also a fanatical Moslem and was arrested in December 1952 for complicity in the murder of a Christian lawyer during municipal elections.

**66. Raschid Keramé**

Born 1923, Tripoli; Sunni Moslem; has law degree from Cairo. Bachelor. Feudal leader who inherited political influence and prestige in Tripoli of his father, Abdel Hamid Keramé, but which he has not yet consolidated. Deputy since 1951; has served as Minister of Justice and National Economy. An ardent advocate of economic union with Syria, he has failed to achieve anything concrete. Weak, vain and moderately intelligent but honest and well meaning. Minister for National Economy and Social Affairs since August 1953.

**67. Charles Kettaneh**

Born 1905, Jerusalem; Roman Catholic; educated American University of Beirut. Married to a charming and intelligent wife. Member of the important merchant firm of Kettaneh Frères. Although scrupulous in his personal dealings he is a rough and ruthless businessman. Has shrewd business sense but outside this field his judgment is fallible. Very wealthy and generous.

**68. Joseph Khadige**

Born 1900, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. President of the Merchants' Association. A strong and shrewd champion of Lebanon's commercial independence of her Moslem neighbours. Taciturn and straightforward.

**69. Anoir Khatib**

Born 1903, Shehim; Sunni Moslem; educated School of Law, Damascus. Formerly judge, then practised as lawyer. Prominent member of the Socialist Progressive Party of Kemal Joumlatt; ex-Deputy. Fairly intelligent and relatively honest.

**70. Izzet Khourchid**

Born 1902, Beirut (of family with Turkish origins); Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government School, Beirut. Married. Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1945-52, with intervals as Chief of Police. Now Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Honest and civilised, he tends to be used to lend respectability to a Department which has lost face.

**71. Sheikh Béchara el-Khoury**

Born 1892, Beirut (with family origins in Mount Lebanon); Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. After bitter opposition to President Eddé and several terms as Prime Minister under French Mandate, he became the first independent President of the Lebanese Republic in 1943, and stood firmly against French pretensions in that year, being interned for his pains. Throughout his term of office he remained grateful for British support at that time. As President he showed great skill in manipulating the balance of political forces in the country and in thereby maintaining himself as the dominant factor in public life. But his inability to say "no" to his family (wife, brothers, son and remoter relatives) led to his régime becoming a synonym for corruption and nepotism. His increasingly blind self-confidence led him to resent and to try to suppress the criticism and clamour for reform and so brought him into conflict with the press and public opinion. During 1952 the opposition to him gradually gained momentum and forced him to resign in September, since when he has retired into private life, although reputed still to take a close, indirect interest in politics. In foreign affairs he had remained consistently pro-Western and anti-Communist throughout his term of office. His shortcomings as President derived mainly from weakness and inability to rise above the moral standards of those who surrounded him; but he had been a clever and successful lawyer; he conducted public business

with efficiency and despatch and he is kindly and amiable in private contacts.

**72. Elias Khoury**

Born 1898, Mount Lebanon; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse, Beirut. Married. Prominent in medical organisations and good works. Ex-Deputy and former Minister of Health. Honest and well meaning but, as far as his political ambitions go, rather a burnt-out volcano owing to his close connexions with President el-Khoury.

**73. Emile Khoury**

Born about 1887; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse, Beirut. Bachelor. Journalist and diplomatist. Formerly foreign correspondent of Egyptian paper *El-Ahram*. Lebanese Minister at Rome 1948-53. Intelligent but not trusted.

**74. Sheikh Fouad el-Khoury**

Born 1894, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Wealthy merchant with a finger in almost every commercial pie. Brother of President el-Khoury whom he supported financially on the way up. During his brother's term of office greatly increased his already substantial fortune.

**75. Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury**

Born 1923; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married to the rich and charming former Jacqueline Arida, daughter of George Arida (No. 10). Elder son of President el-Khoury and member of his law firm. Made a large fortune by exploiting his privileged position during his father's presidency. Lay low for the first eighteen months or so of Chamoun's presidency, but is now steadily resuming his political intrigues. Separated from his wife in January 1955. He has since decided to lie rather low. He is well versed in the technique of corrupt political intrigue, but his methods are so tortuous that they tend to become transparent.

**76. Sheikh Sami el-Khoury**

Born 1895, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Brother of President el-Khoury. Formerly in Department of Justice. Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1944-45. Lebanese Minister at Cairo 1945-52; at Brussels and The Hague since December 1952. A neat little man with no great intelligence or personality.

**77. Sheikh Selim el-Khoury**

Born 1896, Rashmaya; Maronite; educated at Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Brother of President el-Khoury, during whose presidency he exercised great influence behind the scenes and came to be known as "the Sultan." Though he never attended the Chamber he controlled eleven votes there. He thus made himself one of the main targets of the reformers. Little is heard of him now and he is presumably resting on his tarnished laurels.

**78. Victor Khoury**

Born 1903, Hadeth; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and in Mexico. Bachelor whose sister acts as hostess. Formerly lawyer. In 1944 appointed Counsellor at Lebanese Legation at London; Minister in 1947 and Ambassador in 1953. Not a very strong character but makes good use of his amiable social manners.

**79. Salah Lababidi**

Born 1896, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Civil Servant, formerly Subdistrict Governor (Kaimakam) of Baalbek. Appointed Chief of Police of Beirut, March 1953. Arabic scholar; honest and energetic; a great friend of Abdallah Yafi.

**80. Selim Lahoud**

Born 1912. Maronite. Chief engineer of the Water Company of Beirut. Studied engineering at the Ecole des Arts et Métiers of Lille, France. Elected Deputy of Mt. Lebanon in a by-election in April 1954. Honest and hard worker. Appointed 1954 chairman of Litani Board—for hydro-electric and irrigation development of resources of Lebanon's chief river. Married. Friendly.

**81. Subhi Mahmassani**

Born 1908. Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycée Français, American University of Beirut and French School of Law. Married. A judge until 1947 when he resigned to stand unsuccessfully for Parliament. Now practises law; legal adviser to Point IV in the Lebanon. A clean and clever lawyer.

**82. Charles Malik**

Born 1906. North Lebanon; Greek Orthodox; educated American University of Beirut and Harvard. Married. Formerly professor of philosophy and science, American University of Beirut. Since 1945 Lebanese Ambassador at Washington, and Permanent Representative at the United Nations. He has attracted much attention by public speaking in the United States and has built up for himself an influential position in Washington. His reputation in his own country has also gained through his long absence from the scene. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico.* Despite his academic background he now undoubtedly has political ambitions (if he fails to pull off a big United Nations job).

**83. Nusri Malouf**

Born 1911, Mount Lebanon; Greek Catholic, educated Syrian School of Law of Damascus. Bachelor. Lawyer, journalist and politician. Prominent member of the National Appeal Party. Part-owner of *Al Jarida* newspaper; brilliant writer and orator in Arabic. Honest and proud of his independence but lazy. Susceptible to feminine influence.

**84. Abdallah Mashnoq**

Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Journalist, formerly principal of the Moslem Makassed College of Beirut. Owns and edits *Beirut al-Massa*. Edits an excellent monthly magazine, *The Oil Family*, for the I.P.C., and arouses professional jealousy in so doing. A fanatic on the subject of Islam and a strong supporter of Syro-Lebanese union. Clever and a strong personality, but venal (although discreetly). Speaks good English.

**85. Badri Meoushi**

Born 1902; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. President of the High Court since 1950. Only moderately clever but is honest and has proved independent of political influence as a judge.

**86. Jamil Mikroui**

Born 1911, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycée Français, Beirut. Married to a French wife. Influential among younger Moslems and formerly leader of the Moslem nationalist Najjadel Party. Served at Lebanese Legation at London, and Minister at Berne from 1946 until 1953 when he resigned, stood for the 1953 elections and failed to be elected. Is now devoting his attention to building up a lucrative legal practice but is likely to be important politically in the future. Pleasant and friendly, he speaks a little English.

**87. Moussa Mobarak**

Born 1931, Antoura; Maronite; educated Lazarist College, Antoura. Married to an intelligent wife. Closely associated with the French Mandatory authorities 1923-41. Appointed "chef de Cabinet" to President el-Khoury 1943. In charge of Customs Department since 1944 except for an interlude from September 1952 to February 1953 when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Despite his French culture and connexions he is consistently friendly to the British and is honest and independent. He is almost unique in the Lebanon as having resigned a Ministerial portfolio on a point of principle, and he stands well with both former President el-Khoury and President Chamoun. Intelligent and excellent company, but given to talking too much and thus occasionally dropping bricks.

**88. Moukhtar Moukaiech**

Born 1901, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Bachelor. Formerly lawyer. Interned for pro-German activities 1942. Served diplomatic posts including Washington, Ankara and Ottawa. Appointed Consul-General at Marseilles in 1954. Fanatical Moslem. Intelligent but restless and dissatisfied with his lot.

**89. Saad Mounla**

Born 1895, Tripoli; Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government School, Tripoli. Bachelor. Landowner and politician. Deputy and former Minister. Prime Minister in 1946. Appointed Co-Guardian of the Electricity Company of Beirut in 1953 and Chairman of the Electricity Company Board in 1954. A genial old muddle-head.

**90. Kamel Mroueh**

Born 1916; Shia Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Journalist; now editor of *Hayat* and *The Daily Star*. *Broadcast from Berlin in the war*. Violently nationalist. A clever and unscrupulous journalist, not to be trusted. Speaks excellent English. An Arab union enthusiast. Has been an outstanding supporter of the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

**91. Gabriel Murr**

Born 1895; Greek Orthodox; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Minister since August 1953. Served in United States Army in First World War. Returned to Lebanon in 1922 and became cinema proprietor. Deputy 1943-51-53. Several times Minister. Honest and well meaning.

**92. Alfred Naccache**

Born 1894, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Formerly lawyer and President of the Court of Appeal. President of the Lebanese Republic under French Mandate 1941-43 when dismissed by General Catroux. Deputy 1943-47, re-elected Deputy in 1953. A Minister for Foreign Affairs since August 1953. Has done some political journalism. He is much under Jesuit influence but his opposition to President el-Khoury commends him to President Chamoun who often consults him. He is absolutely honest but neither a strong character nor a capable administrator.

**93. Georges Naccache**

Born 1903, Alexandria; Maronite; educated Jesuit College, Alexandria. Married. Formerly civil engineer; now newspaper owner and journalist. Part-proprietor of *L'Orient* since 1924. Writes well and is clever; but gambles and is venal.

**94. Adib Nahas**

Born 1903, Tripoli; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli. Married. Government servant. Formerly Director-General of the Interior

and Mohafez of South Lebanon. Lebanese Minister at Buenos Aires 1948-53, and now Minister at Rio de Janeiro. A first-rate official, honest, intelligent, capable and pro-British. O.B.E. 1947. Promoted to rank of Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro in March 1955.

**95. General Souleiman Naoufal**

Born 1900, Merjayoun; Greek Catholic; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Served in the Lebanese Army under the French Mandate. Appointed head of the Gendarmerie 1941 and dismissed after collaborating with the French in November 1943. Formerly Director-General, Ministry of National Economy, and then Minister of National Economy 1947-48. Now controls the Capitale Cinema and does some journalism. Honest and capable, he believes strongly in maintaining the Christian position in the Lebanon if necessary by authoritarian methods.

**96. Muhieddin Nsouli**

Born 1900, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Journalist. Owns and edits newspaper *Beirut*. Former Deputy. Minister of Information under Sa'eb Salam from April until August 1953. Interned as Axis sympathiser 1941 but is now strong supporter of co-operation with the West against communism. Despite his Arab loyalties, is ready to take a moderate line on such things as Palestine and Middle East defence. Speaks English. Has visited England. Minister of Information and of Finance since formation of present Government. Most time devoted to Finance Ministry, where he has made serious efforts to reduce corruption and maladministration.

**97. Mustapha Nsouli**

Born 1916, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Wife does not go out. Civil Servant; joined Lebanese Administration in 1944 after working in his father's firm (glassware). Appointed Director-General of National Economy in February 1953. Honest and intelligent, but not a strong character. Speaks English and is in close touch with United States Embassy; but also most helpful to this embassy. Accompanied Lebanese President on his visit to South America in May 1954.

**98. Adel Oaseiran**

Born 1903, Sidon; Shia Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Landowner and lawyer. Rival leader to Ahmed el-Assad in South Lebanon. Elected Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies in 1953 and re-elected in 1954. Close political associate of Camille Chamoun (now President) from 1943. Strong Arab nationalist, especially on Palestine, but friendly to Britain. A strong character, blunt and uncompromising. Speaks excellent English.

**99. Henri Pharaon**

Born 1902, Beirut; Greek Catholic; educated privately and Jesuit University, Beirut. Widower. Banker, politician and race-horse owner, in ascending order of interest. Ex-Deputy and several times Minister, usually of Foreign Affairs. He is related to President el-Khoury under whose régime he established himself as one of the principal "robber barons." By lavish expenditure poses as champion of Christian lower classes in Beirut. Homosexual and not above employing gangsters or bribery, he represents the worst type of Middle Eastern politician with whom we have to deal. Nevertheless, although he is off the political stage for the time being, he believes in co-operation with the West and has spoken in favour of Middle East defence, but is strongly opposing the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

**100. General Nouréddine Rifai**

Born about 1895, Tripoli; Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government School, Beirut. Married. Served in the Gendarmerie. Formerly Mohafez of North Lebanon. Appointed Director of Internal Security Forces June 1952 until March 1953, when he was made Inspector-General only of the Internal Security Forces, being thus deprived of some prerogatives. An impressive little man but a firm, capable administrator. Homosexual.

**101. Mme. Hélène Riban**

Born about 1907, Beirut; Greek Orthodox. Wife of Dr. Habib Riban of American University of Beirut. A leading advocate of women's rights. Formerly taught in a school for girls in Cairo. Appointed municipal councillor February 1953.

**102. Abdel Rahman Sahmarani**

Born 1903, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and the Sorbonne. Bachelor. His sister acts as his hostess. President of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce since 1949. A pompous bore, much given to lecturing Western representatives on how to conduct their policy so as to satisfy Arab aspirations, but unfortunately quite influential, particularly in a Pan-Arab direction.

**103. Mohammed Salam**

Born 1897, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Businessman interested in Middle East Airlines. Runs the Moslem Makassed College and believes in British methods of education. Not a very inspiring personality but loyal to his British connexions. Speaks good English.

**104. Saeb Salam**

Born about 1902, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married to a charming and gentle wife. Brother of Mohammed Salam (No. 103). Politician and business man. Chairman, with a small personal holding, of Middle East Air Lines. Deputy in the 1943 and 1951 Chambers. Formerly Minister of the Interior. Prime Minister for a few days in September 1952 when he helped administer the *coup de grâce* to President el-Khoury. Again Prime Minister from April until August 1953. He has many American connexions but is also sincerely friendly to Britain. A bit of an adventurer in politics and business but he is intelligent and forward looking and is likely to remain a prominent figure. Speaks excellent English.

**105. Anis Saleh**

Born 1907, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Formerly Magistrate and Director-General of Justice. He made himself too useful to President el-Khoury and did not survive his fall.

**106. Joseph Salem**

Born 1897, Tyre; Greek Catholic; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Influential business man (mainly banking and insurance). Lebanese Minister at Cairo 1944-45. Minister of the Interior 1945-46. On close terms with President el-Khoury but maintains contact with President Chamoun and is usually well informed on what goes on behind the scenes. Although rather boorish at first sight he is usually friendly and co-operative and certainly has intelligence and independent judgment.

**107. Colonel Toufik Salem**

Born 1904; Tyre; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Trained in the French army (as a contemporary of General

Shishakli). Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. A brusque and quick-tempered officer who tends to fret under General Chehab's calmer methods but is fundamentally good-natured and helpful.

#### 108. Joseph Saouda

Born 1888; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and Paris. Married. Lawyer, formerly Deputy and journalist. Strongly anti-Moslem but also consistent opponent of French influence in the Lebanon. Lebanese Minister to Brazil 1946-53 and the Holy See since 1953.

#### 109. Fouad Sarrouf

Born 1906 in Cairo, of Lebanese origin; Greek Orthodox; educated at the American University of Beirut. Married to a pleasant wife born and brought up in Manchester. Journalist. Edited *Al-Mokattam* newspaper in Cairo, founded by his father. Wrote Roosevelt's life in Arabic. Appointed Vice-President (in charge of Public Relations) of American University of Beirut in 1952. Capable and honest.

#### 110. Mohammed Shoucair

Born 1912, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Politician and journalist. Member of the tiny but vocal National Appeal Party. Was a disciple and great admirer of late Riad Solh. Clever, ambitious and honest by Lebanese standards but loyal to his friends. Visited England 1952.

#### 111. Sami Shoucair

Born 1923, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and studied electrical engineering in the United States. Bachelor. Director of Civil Aviation in the Lebanon from 1950 until 1953 when he was dismissed and charged with illegal handling of the Civil Aviation budget; his case is still *sub judice*. Although born wealthy, would not miss an opportunity of making money. His main interests are women and money and he is unscrupulous and energetic in pursuit of these objectives.

#### 112. Abdel Karim Sibahi

Born 1887, Hama, Syria; Sunni Moslem; educated in Istanbul. A merchant with real estate in Germany where he spent the years of World War II when he was well-known for his pro-Nazi sympathies. Having been appointed a municipal councillor at the request of Abdallah Yafi, he was elected President of the Municipality in February 1953 and re-elected in 1955. Lacks energy and experience in administration. Involved in two administrative municipal scandals in 1951 in regard to building a slaughter-house and the aerodrome.

#### 113. Alfred Skaf

Born 1907, Zahlé; Greek Catholic; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. A powerful figure in the Bekaa but off the political stage since an unsuccessful term as Minister of Supply in 1943.

#### 114. Jean Skaf

Born 1908, Zahlé; Greek Catholic; educated at Zahlé. Bachelor. Leading member of the Phalange in the Bekaa. Ex-Deputy and former Minister. Intelligent and ambitious. Friendly.

#### 115. Kazem Solh

Born 1905, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Istanbul, Damascus and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. President of the National Appeal Party. Lebanese Minister at Baghdad since 1947, promoted to the rank of Ambassador in 1953. Intelligent and ambitious.

#### 116. Sami Solh

Born 1891, Sidon; Sunni Moslem; educated Istanbul Government College. Widower. Son of a Turkish official. Formerly Magistrate and President of the High Court. Prime Minister 1942-43, 1945-46 and 1952, when he resigned in protest against President el-Khoury's attempt to throw upon him the blame for corruption in public life. He retains considerable influence with the lower Moslem classes in Beirut, but although amiable and well meaning is too vain and too weak to follow any consistent line of thought or policy for very long. Formed the Cabinet in September 1954; visited Turkey with President in April 1955 and headed Lebanese delegation to Bandung Conference in April 1955.

#### 117. Takiuddin Solh

Born 1910, Saïda; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Cousin of late Riad Solh and nephew of Sami Solh (No. 118). Arab nationalist with political ambitions; dabbles in journalism. Failed in 1953 elections. Prominent member of National Appeal Party. Formerly Counsellor of Lebanese Legation at Cairo; later in Secretariat of Arab League. Very intelligent and relatively honest, but given to intrigues.

#### 118. Georges Tabet

Born 1891, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Several times Minister. Has some influence in Maronite circles but is rather a contemptible old man out-classed by his wife.

#### 119. Jacques Tabet

Born 1887, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite and land-owner who keeps in the social swing but has no political significance.

#### 120. Mme. Laure Tabet

Born 1896, Alexandria; Maronite; educated at Roman Catholic College for Girls, Alexandria. Wife of Georges Tabet (No. 118). Having no children, diverted her energies into feminist activities in and outside Lebanon, notably Red Cross and International Council of Women. Appointed municipal councillor, February 1953. Highly civilised and speaks good English.

#### 121. Maurice Tabet

Born 1919, Beirut; Maronite; educated at Jesuit University, Beirut. Son of Jacques Tabet (No. 119). Married to an attractive Canadian girl. Joined Lebanese Foreign Service in 1947; served in New York and Ottawa. Since 1952 Assistant Chief of Protocol. Nice manners but little experience. Speaks good English.

#### 122. Bahige Takiuddin

Born 1908, Baaklin; Druze; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. Deputy; formerly Minister of Agriculture. A loyal adherent of the Arslan faction and of President el-Khoury, whose spokesman he has often been in the Chamber.

#### 123. Khalil Takiuddin

Born 1905, Baaklin; Druze; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Civil Servant, and Arabic poet. Served mainly in the Secretariat of the Chamber until appointed Lebanese Minister at Moscow and Stockholm 1946-53 when he became Minister to Mexico. Clever and socially presentable but servile and venal. Like the rest of his family, an opportunist.

#### 124. Philippe Takla

Born 1914; Greek Catholic; educated Collège des Lazaristes, Antoura. Married to a rich Lebanese of Brazil by virtue of whose fortune he has acquired a certain independent standing. Lawyer and politician. Ex-Deputy and loyal supporter of President el-Khoury. Several times Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is intelligent and in most respects honest and has pleasant manners. He is quick on the uptake and easy to deal with on matters of business. Friendly and helpful to this embassy. Has acquired a major interest in *Diar* (Arabic language) newspaper. Represented Lebanese President at ceremonies held in Uruguay on the taking of office of Uruguayan President in February 1955.

#### 125. Colonel Fauzi Traboulsi

Born 1901, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Served Lebanese Gendarmerie, later in command of Internal Security Forces. A personal friend of President Chamoun. Honest and loyal but tactless, vain, pompous, excitable and of mediocre intelligence.

#### 126. Gabriel Trad

Born 1893, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite who enjoys parties but is also generous and prominent in charitable organisations. Honest and likeable but with no pretensions to intelligence, although he has travelled widely.

#### 127. André Tuoni

Born 1910, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli. Married. Civil Servant. Formerly Director-General of Finance, now Director-General of Public Works. Relatively honest, hard worker and capable but an unattractive creature. Unpopular with his subordinates.

#### 128. Ghassan Tuoni

Born 1926, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated at the American University of Beirut and then studied journalism at Harvard University, United States. Bachelor. Journalist and politician. Prominent member of the P.P.S.; Deputy since 1951. Advises and assists brother (Walid—Reuters' correspondent) in production of *Nahar*. Educated, ambitious and energetic. Relatively honest. The typical young man with great possessions but Left-wing inclinations. Speaks excellent English and visited England 1951. Deputy President, Chamber of Deputies, since July 1953. Married in January 1955 the daughter of Mohammed Aly Hamade, a Druze, without having to change his religion.

#### 129. Charles Tyan

Born 1900, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Civil Servant employed in Ministry of Public Works 1943-52 where he acquired wide expert knowledge of oil and transport. Now out of a regular job. Undoubtedly very corrupt but helpful to the I.P.C. Secretary to the Conseil de Planification et Développement Economique.

#### 130. Abdallah Yafi

Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and in France. Married. Lawyer and politician. Several times Minister. Prime Minister 1936 and again 1951-52 and 1953-54. A comparatively honest politician who grew increasingly restive under President el-Khoury's régime. Prime Minister since August 1953. He is still a possible Prime Minister. It is probably with this in mind and with a view to the next election rather than out of any real conviction that he at one time played with the idea of forming a Democratic

Socialist Party but this has never materialised. Well intentioned and friendly but rather dull and colourless. Opposed Turco-Iraqi Pact.

#### 131. Simon Zouein

Born 1910, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Served all his life in Gendarmerie; now head of it with rank of colonel. Honest and loyal.

#### 132. Constantin Zuraik

Born 1908, Damascus; Greek Orthodox; educated American University of Beirut and United States. Married. Professor at American University of Beirut; then president of Syrian University, Damascus, which post he relinquished in 1952 to become vice-president of the American University of Beirut (Administration). Nationalist; honest and capable.

#### Obituary

Michel Chiha (No. 35 of 1954 Report).  
Stephen Pentose (No. 100 of 1954 Report).  
His Beatitude Patriarch Antoine Pierre Arida (No. 2 "Index of Religious Personalities in the Lebanon" of 1954 Report).

#### Index of Religious Personalities in the Lebanon

##### Maronite

1. Monseigneur Antoine Abed.
2. Monseigneur Augustin Boustani.
3. Monseigneur Pierre Dib.
4. Monseigneur Elias Farah.
5. Monseigneur Boulos Meouschi.
6. Monseigneur Ignace Mobarak.
7. Monseigneur Abdallah Noufaim.
8. Monseigneur Ignace Ziade.

##### Greek Catholic

9. Monseigneur Philippe Nabaa.
10. Monseigneur Maximos Sayegh.

##### Greek Orthodox

11. Monseigneur Elie Karam.
12. Monseigneur Elie Saliby.

##### Syrian Catholic

13. Cardinal Gabriel I<sup>er</sup> Tappouni

##### Armenian Catholic

14. Cardinal Grégoire Pierre XV Agagianian.

##### Armenian Orthodox

15. Monseigneur Khoren Patoyan.

##### Jew

16. Benzion Lechtman.

##### Sunni Moslem

17. Sheikh Mohammed Alaya.

##### Shia Moslem

18. Sayed Abdel Hussein Sharafeddin.
19. Sheikh Mohamed Abo Chakra.
20. Sheikh Rashid Hamadeh

##### Druze

21. Mokadem Ali Mizher.

## Maronite

1. **Monseigneur Antoine Abed**  
Born 1901. Archbishop of Tripoli since 1931. Closely associated with the French but friendly to this embassy. Also interested in commerce.
2. **Monseigneur Augustin Boustani**  
Born 1872, Deir el-Kamar. Archbishop of South Lebanon residing at Beit-Iddin. He comes of a leading Maronite family and is intelligent and well educated but shows no friendliness to the British.
3. **Monseigneur Pierre Dib**  
Born about 1885. Archbishop of Cairo but lives mainly at the Patriarch's seat at Bkerké. Learned and reputedly virtuous. A member of the commission which conducts the Patriarch's affairs and a possible successor to him.
4. **Monseigneur Elias Farah**  
A Maronite, formerly Archimandrite representing the Maronite Patriarch in Alexandria (Wakil Patriarch). Aged 48. Studied at the Jesuit School in Beirut. A good speaker in Arabic and comes from South Lebanon, Kfarbo'hum. Appointed Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus in May 1954.
5. **Monseigneur Boulos Meouschi**  
Born 1892, Jezzín. Archbishop of Tyr, after living many years in the United States. He lives at Bkerké and is chairman of the commission running the Patriarch's business. He is vigorous and intelligent and a more modern type than his archiepiscopal colleagues. Speaks English.
6. **Monseigneur Ignace Mobarak**  
Born 1876; studied at Rome. Appointed Archbishop of Beirut 1919. A vigorous champion of the civic rights of the Maronite community, but apt to become quarrelsome. He several times offered his resignation and was surprised and shocked when the Pope accepted it suddenly in 1952. He now lives at Bkerké.
7. **Monseigneur Abdallah Noujaim**  
Maronite, born 1904 at Baalbek. Studied for a short period in Rome. For the last few years has been partly in charge of the Maronite Community in Baalbek. During the British occupation (1941-45) always entertained very good relations with the British military authorities. Is now on the Patriarch's staff at Bkerké.
8. **Monseigneur Ignace Ziadé**  
Born 1906. Archbishop of Aleppo 1945 and Beirut 1952. An educated and pleasant personality who is also a member of the commission managing the Patriarchate. In private conversation very ready to advocate the need for a strong Western policy in the Middle East.

## Greek Catholic

9. **Monseigneur Philippe Nabaa**  
Born about 1905; studied at Rome. Now Archbishop of Beirut. A genial and cultivated prelate who shows friendliness to this embassy and looks generally Westward.
10. **Monseigneur Maximos Sayegh**  
Born 1878, Aleppo. Archbishop of Tyre 1917 and of Beirut 1933, and Patriarch since 1947. Popular among his small community. Anti-Communist and believes in the need for Western support of the Christian position in the Lebanon.

## Greek Orthodox

11. **Monseigneur Elie Karam**  
Born 1896. Archbishop of Mount Lebanon, living just outside Beirut. Maintains friendly relations with all foreigners but generally regarded as a Communist sympathiser and known to have close connexions with the Soviet Legation (e.g., he celebrated a mass for the repose of Stalin's soul).
12. **Monseigneur Elie Saliby**  
Born 1876. Archbishop of Beirut since 1935. A smooth-tongued ecclesiastic. Despite his professions of friendship with Britain has close contacts with the Cypriot supporters of Enosis with Greece. But he is a tough element of resistance to the all too pervasive communism in the Greek Orthodox Church.

## Syrian Catholic

13. **Cardinal Gabriel I<sup>r</sup> Tappouni**  
Born 1879, Mosul. Consecrated Bishop 1913; Archbishop of Aleppo 1921; Patriarch 1929; Cardinal 1933. Worked closely with the French who supported him during the Mandate as a counterpoise to the Maronites. A strong champion of Christian rights in Lebanon and Syria. Despite his pro-French reputation makes friendly gestures to this embassy.

## Armenian Catholic

14. **Cardinal Grégoire Pierre XV Agagianian**  
Born 1895, Tiflis; studied at Rome. Ordained 1917; consecrated Bishop 1935; Patriarch of Armenian Catholics throughout the world 1937; appointed Cardinal 1945. A cultivated man of small stature but imposing presence. Speaks English and is in touch with English-speaking Catholics throughout the world. Despite his Russian origins, a vigorous opponent of communism, and unites in his person many opponents of East and West (political, ecclesiastical and geographical) and is therefore generally regarded, perhaps somewhat optimistically, as *parabile*.

## Armenian Orthodox

15. **Monseigneur Khoren Paroyan**  
Born about 1905, Cyprus. Came to the Lebanon at the age of 15 and is now Archbishop of the Lebanon. He remains a British subject and still visits his parents every year in Cyprus. He is a friendly individual of no great intellectual stature.

## Jew

16. **Benzion Lechtman**  
Born about 1891 in Poland. Came to Beirut 1935 and has acted as Rabbi since 1948. Even the Jewish community regard him as colourless.

## Sunni Moslem

17. **Sheikh Mohammed Alaya**  
Born 1883, Beirut; primary education only, but after many years in religious courts is experienced in Shia law. Twice married and twice divorced. Appointed Mufti of the Lebanese Republic 1952 as a result of pressure on President el-Khoury by Abdallah Yah and the Salam family. Honest but weak and unintelligent.

## Shia Moslem

18. **Sayed Abdel Hussein Sharafeddin**  
Born about 1867; studied at Najaf, the Shia holy place in Iraq. Now chief of the Shia community in the Lebanon. Violently anti-Christian and anti-Western but honest and much respected by his community.

## 19. Sheikh Mohamed Abo Chakra

Sheikh Akl of the Druze Community elected in the summer of 1948; about 55 years old; married and lives at Amatour. Sheikh Mohamed is not of a high education but a good speaker. Before his election he was the owner of a garage of transport in Damascus. He is regarded as a "foster child" of Kamal Jumblat. He is shrewd and a practical Druze, not over his religion, but over his Druze internal political party.

## 20. Sheikh Rashid Hamadeh

Sheikh Akl of the Druze Community elected in September 1954; about 60 years old; married and an inhabitant of Baaklin. Sheikh Rashid is a *licencié en droit* from the French School of Law in Beirut. He comes from a leading Druze family. Once a magistrate in the Lebanese Court of Appeal, but dismissed on the charge of accepting a bribe; he was in fact caught red-handed by Fuad Ammoun, then his chief.

## Druze

## 21. Mokadem Ali Mizher

Born 1896. Cousin of Kemal Joubblatt. Formerly a lawyer with political ambitions. He was appointed Kadi of the Druzes in Lebanon in 1945. He speaks English and professes the traditional Druze friendship for the British but is probably a rather sly intriguer.